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This book was researched and written amid a great deal of chaos and a 
series of crises, most of them political, some pandemic—related. Typically, 
this setup does not bode well for in-depth scholarly thinking but I am 
convinced that this case is an exception.
I started this project in 2015 and did most of the data collection in 
2015–2016. Then in the Fall of 2016, I was appointed Pro-Rector for 
Social Sciences and Humanities at the Central European University (CEU) 
in Budapest where I had been working for a decade. What seemed like a 
fairly peaceful administrative job in a small college changed overnight 
when in the Spring of 2017 the Hungarian government passed a modifica-
tion of the higher education law, which made the operation of CEU in 
Budapest impossible. This was a straightforward political attack, part of 
the vilification campaign of the university’s founder, George Soros.
Given my high-level administrative position, I was thrust into the midst 
of the political struggle to save the university and keep it working in the 
place where it had deep roots and had been operating for 25  years, in 
Budapest. This put a quick stop to the progress of my research but gave 
me a first-hand ethnographic view of sorts into the workings of anti-liberal 
power, especially as it targeted institutional academic freedom. Eventually, 
CEU lost the battle with the government and moved its graduate educa-
tion to Vienna. While a ruling of the European Court of Justice in 2020 
invalidated Hungary’s modified higher education law, the decision came 
two years too late to help. This would have been a different book had I 
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CHAPTER 1
Orbánistan and the Anti-gender Rhetoric 
in Hungary
Abstract This chapter introduces Hungary’s anti-liberal political rule and 
its gender regime. It traces policy changes in Hungary since 2010, dis-
cusses the legacies of the state socialist gender regimes and the formation 
of a new, anti-liberal one. I introduce the term “carefare” and discuss how 
the concept of “gender” has been deployed by Hungarian politicians to 
legitimate an increase in women’s unpaid care burden and their lack of 
attention to gender inequality in the labor market. I end the chapter with 
a description of my research methods and provide an outline for the rest 
of the book.
Keywords Illiberalism • Anti-liberalism • Post-state socialism • Gender 
regime • Hungary • Anti-gender rhetoric
Hungary is proof positive that history did not end, as Francis Fukuyama 
famously predicted, after the collapse of the state socialist regimes in the 
early 1990s. Within 20 years, the country became the poster child of dem-
ocratic backsliding, right-wing populism and anti-liberal authoritarian 
rule, all combined with a capitalist economy whose operation oscillates 
between global neoliberal and eastward-looking neo-patrimonial princi-
ples. This novel form of governance is closely intertwined with a novel 
type of state gender regime—a combination of old and new elements in an 
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exorbitantly patriarchal mix—which I call “carefare”. This book describes 
the concept of carefare and its real-life manifestation in anti-liberal 
Hungary. Admittedly my argument is about a single country, but since 
elements of anti-liberal governance are gaining ground every day, the les-
sons here should serve as potential for comparison elsewhere.
“There is no such thing as gender!” claimed a high-level Hungarian 
politician in response to critiques of the government’s ban on masters’ 
degrees in Gender Studies in 2018. And in denial, the term “gender” has 
been spread far and wide. After its landslide victory in 2010, one of the 
first pieces of legislation Viktor Orbán’s government introduced ended 
the requirement to eliminate gender stereotypes in the national curricu-
lum of kindergartens. Soon the government moved from kindergarteners 
to a wide range of other social groups. The Parliament refused to ratify the 
“Istanbul Convention”1 by claiming offense at the word “gender” in the 
document, enshrined the requirement that families consist of a biological 
male and a biological female, passed numerous pieces of legislation which 
reformulated, restricted and rigidified the social roles assigned to women 
and men, threatened women’s reproductive rights, prohibited the option 
of sex change, as well as adoption by unmarried or non-heterosexual indi-
viduals. Members of the government have lobbied aggressively for the 
elimination of the term “gender” along with the concept of gender equal-
ity from policy proposals of international organizations. The government 
stopped funding NGOs which addressed gender equality problems and 
put an end to all government agencies that designed, implemented and 
monitored legislation to promote women. Through policies like these, 
accompanied by unabating government-inspired media propaganda, an 
anti-liberal gender regime has been constructed. Although this gender 
regime has its roots in the lengthy history of Hungary’s varied past politi-
cal orders, and carries some elements of both institutionalized gender rela-
tions in Western neoliberal democracies and the Central European state 
socialist gender regimes of the recent past, it is also distinctly different 
from both.
Institutionalized patterns of gender relations or “gender regimes” are 
shaped by and themselves are constituent parts of political-economic 
governance (Connell 1987; Walby 2020). The literature on the 
1 The “Istanbul Convention” or more precisely the “Council of Europe Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence” came into 
force in 2014. It was signed but not ratified by Hungary.
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transformation of gender relations in anti-liberal regimes, especially in 
Hungary and Poland, has primarily focused on the ways in which the term 
“gender” has been used to create political mobilization and legitimacy, 
build internal loyalty and gather votes (Grzebalska and Pető 2018; 
Korolczuk and Graff 2018; Kováts 2020; Krizsán and Roggeband 2018). 
In this book I want to highlight different aspects of the newly emerging 
state gender regime: the transformation of women into carefare workers 
and the gender regime’s—potential or real—impact not only on gender 
but also on class inequalities.
Since 2010 the Hungarian government instituted policies and policy 
practice which offer a novel response to the “crisis of care” problem (Fraser 
2016). In anti-liberal Hungary, care work is not commodified, instead it is 
sentimentalized in a specifically gendered way. It is not outsourced to 
poorly paid immigrant laborers, or widely available for purchase on the 
market from for-profit providers. It is also not offered—in sufficient quan-
tity or quality—at a more moderate cost in institutions of care maintained 
by the state or by community-based non-governmental organizations. 
Instead, anti-liberal Hungary has been aggressively promoting the inten-
sification of women’s domestic care load through its all-encompassing 
pronatalism which ties social citizenship rights to having children, yet 
offers highly selective state support for the long-term work of caring for 
small children, even less for other forms of care. Simultaneously, women’s 
paid work is required to maintain the family’s subsistence (and often their 
access to state subsidies for children) but labor market gender inequality is 
openly embraced. Most women end up combining an increased volume of 
unpaid care work with long hours of full-time paid work in an economy 
that is shamelessly slated against those with care responsibilities. 
Compliance with such an exacerbated and unequal work burden is elicited 
through the rejection of gender equality as a principle, the elimination of 
alternative life courses for women, and a sustained political discourse 
which sentimentalizes and naturalizes women’s care responsibility. 
Highlighting the analogies with workfare and prisonfare regimes of neo-
liberal capitalist economies (Peck 2001; Wacquant 2010), I call Hungary’s 
state gender regime variant “carefare”. Carefare, I argue serves as one of 
the main political, ideological and economic backbones of Hungary’s anti- 
liberal regime.
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Hungary Since 2010: Building an anti-liBeral State
Right-wing, antidemocratic, authoritarian-leaning parties and govern-
ments have been emerging onto the international political scene in record 
numbers all over the world, but Hungary’s case is one of the starkest. 
Hungary is the only European country whose democracy has been down-
graded by the independent watchdog Freedom House to the category 
“Transitional or hybrid regime” and the only country classified as only 
“partly free” within the EU (Freedom House 2021). Political scientists 
cite extreme party polarization (Enyedi 2016) and emerging populist ten-
dencies (Rupnik 2016) as key enabling factors leading to democratic back-
sliding. The instability of democratic institutions after 1990, a pre-war 
tendency toward right-wing conservatism, the weakness of a professional 
middle class and the lack of a lively civil society will have also contributed 
to the ease with which Orbán’s anti-liberal discourse and political rule 
gained ground. The economic trauma brought about by the collapse of 
the state socialist economy, the devastation of the ensuing economic crisis, 
the quick disillusionment with the unequal rewards of global neoliberal 
capitalism, which became especially evident during the 2008 economic 
recession were also important causal factors (Krastev 2016; Scheiring 
2015, 2020). In this context, populist and nationalist ideologies promoted 
by Viktor Orbán and his party, FIDESZ–KDNP2 found fertile ground. 
The alliance won a landslide election victory in 2010 and started the work 
of building a new form of governance. Borrowing Fahreed Zakaria’s term 
(Zakaria 1997), Orbán himself named his rule an “illiberal democracy” in 
2014 and later a “Christian Democracy” in 2018.
There is no consensus among political scientists about what aspect of 
this new form of governance is the most important or the most enduring. 
Some point to the dominance of a single party (Scheppele 2014), others 
emphasize its populist features (Enyedi 2016; Müller 2016). Bálint Magyar 
(2016) describes the regime as a “mafia state” where systemic corruption 
serves the interests of the political rulers and their loyalists. Other termi-
nologies, emphasizing yet other features, include “hybrid regime” (Bozóki 
and Hegedűs 2018), “authoritarian capitalism” (Scheiring 2015), 
2 The full name is FIDESZ—Magyar Polgári Szövetség (FIDESZ—Hungarian Civil 
Association) in alliance with KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party). The term 
FIDESZ itself is an abbreviation of the original name of the party until 1995, Fiatal 
Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Young Democrats). I will call the ruling alliance 
FIDESZ–KDNP from here on.
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“neoliberal authoritarianism” (Szalai 2016), “managed illiberal demo-
cratic capitalism” (Szelenyi and Csillag 2015) or “national authoritarian-
ism” (Kelemen 2017), to cite just a few. My emphasis when writing about 
gender relations is on the regime’s radical and explicitly stated rejection of 
everyday liberal values, of the principle of equal opportunities, of tolerance 
of difference from a preconceived norm—hence I call it an anti-lib-
eral regime.
While there may not be a consensus about how best to name the 
regime, there is little doubt about the fact that during its more than a 
decade (so far) in power, Orbán’s government has profoundly reshaped 
the principles and practice of political rule in the country: it has central-
ized and cemented its political power through legislative changes, 
decreased media freedom, freedom of speech and important forms of aca-
demic freedom, it has spent vast amounts of taxpayer’s money on hate-
mongering propaganda to serve its political goals and created a regiment 
of loyal cadres through corruption and cronyism. At the same time, the 
government has followed many of the prescriptions of neoliberally minded 
structural adjustment policies: keeping the state deficit low, enforcing state 
austerity in areas where it would have served the vulnerable, weakening 
the rights of labor in successful bids to court foreign investors. It has also 
wasted resources from the European Union’s structural funds and from 
the economic boom following the 2008 crisis by spending on frivolous 
investments designed to boost national pride and strengthen Hungarian 
identity, not to mention the personal wealth of select loyal followers, while 
neglecting to channel resources into health care, education or social sup-
port. It may be worth reviewing these policies in some detail before we 
proceed to discuss the gender regime built to support and service them.
Upon gaining power the FIDESZ–KDNP government rewrote elec-
toral rules in a way that favored the ruling party (Law CCIII/2011). But 
the government went well beyond familiar acts of gerrymandering: the 
new electoral law passed in 2011 cemented its power by making the deci-
sion on district boundaries pass as a “cardinal law” which could only be 
changed by two-thirds of the votes in Parliament. The new legislation 
turned the elections from a two-level system to a single-round one, and 
gave voting rights to typically right-leaning ethnic Hungarians living out-
side the borders of Hungary. These were some of the main actions taken 
to favor the incumbent party and guarantee its long-term hold on power 
(Scheppele 2014).
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Next, the government produced a new Constitution and the FIDESZ–
KDNP dominated Parliament hastily passed it without much consultation 
or debate. Since the party had a two-third majority they did not need the 
support of opposition parties, so the procedure could be sped up. This 
new Constitution started the work of dismantling liberal democracy. It 
centralized power in the hands of the ruling party, weakened the power of 
the Constitutional Court and the role of the judiciary. The government 
made an attempt at replacing judges whom they considered too indepen-
dent (Bánkuti et al. 2012). In the following decade the European Union 
(EU) initiated numerous legal procedures against Hungary to enforce the 
principles of the rule of law, none of which really steered the government 
off course. Orbán managed to resist even more radical attempts, such as 
when in 2020 the EU sought to include a clause in its budget that would 
require that countries abide by the principle of the rule of law in exchange 
for receiving EU funding. Hungary and Poland vetoed the budget pro-
posal and the pandemic rescue package attached to it, which forced the 
Union to postpone and soften the measures and allowed Orbán to claim, 
yet again, “victory over Brussels”.
Numerous other formerly independent institutions, large and small, in 
areas from finance to culture were gradually drawn under government 
control. To start, the government revised the media law and the vast 
majority of mainstream media were sold to government-friendly investors, 
who promptly steered them into a direction of absolute loyalty to the gov-
ernment. FIDESZ cadres were appointed as editors-in-chief, and journal-
ists were expected to produce stories and accounts which corresponded 
closely to the message the government wanted to popularize. By 2018, 
several local media entities were united in a single conglomerate—a pro- 
government media empire of vast proportions. All national public televi-
sion and radio channels, practically all regional papers and many internet 
outlets have essentially become propaganda machines reminiscent of the 
worst of the state socialist era (ATLO 2020).
Cultural and academic freedoms have similarly been curbed. The gov-
ernment extended its financial and educational control over all state uni-
versities—in some cases more radically than in others. The self-governance 
of academic institutions was eliminated and the decision-making authority 
of the universities’ Senate was replaced by the rule of government- 
appointed committees. Other scholarly institutions suffered similar or 
worse fates: the rights and budgets of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
were significantly reduced and its research institutes were reorganized in a 
 E. FODOR
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way that allowed political actors to have a vast influence over the distribu-
tion of research funding. The government passed an amendment to the 
higher education law in 2017 specifically targeting Central European 
University (CEU)—a US accredited graduate school founded, among 
others, by George Soros—and proceeded to force it to leave the country. 
Appeals to the European Union eventually led to a ruling of the European 
Court of Justice in favor of CEU, but the three years it took the Court to 
come to this conclusion made the decision moot. More granular-level 
interference into academic life has been a daily occurrence and incidents 
are too numerous to list here. One may be mentioned as it is of particular 
significance for the theme of this book: in 2018, the government unilater-
ally and without consultation or notice de-accredited gender studies MA 
degrees in the country.
In addition to the media and educational/research institutions, non- 
governmental organizations also came to be targeted by government ire: 
those which worked in areas that did not please the government were 
simply de-funded. Externally funded international NGOs have been suf-
fering ongoing persecution. To retain a semblance of grassroots action, 
the government instead initiated and funds generously a loyal circle of 
“civil” organizations serving the party’s agenda, and has been channeling 
vast amounts of money to a limited number of handpicked, loyal churches.
Government-appointed loyal cadres manage these institutions in fields 
as diverse as the economy and financial oversight, through the judiciary, to 
the cultural field, including managers of theaters, the national library and 
various museums, too numerous to count. In a fashion painfully reminis-
cent of the early days of the state socialist era, a new intellectual- professional 
upper class is in formation, and appointments depend primarily on loyalty 
rather than actual professional expertise or excellence in the given field. 
These new cadres then receive a significant income through salaries and 
kickbacks from government funded projects as well as all the power of 
their office, as long as they are willing to deliver what the government 
expects.
Parallel to this is the creation via corruption of a wealthy upper class, a 
new bourgeoisie, whose economic prosperity depends solely on the 
amount of money they siphon off government- and EU-funded invest-
ments. Some of these assets remain in their own bank accounts, but most 
find their way back to the coffers of the ruling party. Corruption is 
extremely widespread and has increased precipitously in recent years in 
Hungary. This has been noted by practically all international agencies 
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dealing with the issue (see, e.g., a report by GRECO 2020). The process 
of informal, illegal channeling of monies to individuals and politically loyal 
companies is built into the very core of the economic system, from the 
expectation that physicians get “tipped” in state hospitals to the Hungarian 
franchise of large software companies which receive kickback from state 
clients. Even proven obvious cases of corruption go unpursued and 
unpunished as Hungary’s Attorney General, a loyal party cadre, is 
extremely reluctant to prosecute them.
Notwithstanding its political populism and anti-liberal tendencies, the 
Orbán government did not altogether abandon all principles of neoliberal 
capitalism. FIDESZ–KDNP came to power in 2010 in the midst of the 
economic crisis and the economic performance of the country was weak in 
the first few years. By 2013–2014, however, production picked up, as the 
international economic and financial context improved and European 
Union structural funds continued to pour in. By the middle of the second 
decade of the twenty-first century, Hungary’s economic growth outper-
formed EU averages, employment growth was striking, and real wages 
increased spectacularly in every year.
Much of this success was based on Hungary’s ability to attract foreign 
investors (Bandelj 2007) and these investments increased radically after 
EU membership. Well-known economists have argued that Hungary and 
other Central and East European countries may be net losers of EU mem-
bership, because multinational profit extraction is higher than the gains 
obtained via EU structural fund payments (Piketty 2018). Other accounts 
enumerate the various benefits multinational production has brought to 
the country and which cannot easily be expressed in cash payments 
(Meszaros 2018). For our purposes it is enough to note that the govern-
ment’s desire to attract foreign capital is undeniable and courting foreign 
direct investment has required creating a labor market structure where 
wages are low and reasonably trained workers are docile. In 2021 Hungary 
had the second lowest minimum wage in the EU overtaking only Bulgaria 
in this regard, and recent media accounts claim that over 40% of people do 
in fact work for the minimum wage, at least as per their formal employ-
ment contract. Although average wage levels significantly increased in the 
late 2010s, they still remain one of the lowest within the EU (Eurostat 
2021a). And in recent years, the government has passed several other reg-
ulations with the goal of directly pleasing foreign investors and weakening 
labor rights: compulsory school age was reduced to 16 to feed the unskilled 
labor requirements of companies, the amount of overtime work an 
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employer can require was increased by 25% and a great deal of flexibility 
was guaranteed to employers to compensate for the period, unemploy-
ment benefits were cut to almost nothing, the strike laws were changed in 
a way to make it more difficult for the already weak Hungarian trade 
unions to organize, work hours were lengthened and vacation time cut in 
some sectors (Scheiring and Szombati 2019).
Even in times of economic prosperity when wage growth was fairly 
steep and the state budget flush with money, the government neglected to 
channel resources into the three key areas which typically would increase 
the wellbeing of the population in a forward looking manner: health care, 
public education and social support. These, not coincidentally, are the sec-
tors where female employment is especially high. While tax cuts and 
income linked benefits guaranteed higher income for the more advan-
taged, researchers note an ongoing stark state austerity in cash support 
targeting those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. In terms of health 
care, the glaring shortage of doctors, hospital beds and nursing staff, 
partly due to the out-migration of trained professionals because of the 
extremely low salaries and punitive work conditions, became clearly 
exposed during the coronavirus pandemic. In a period when economic 
growth leveled at around 4–5% annually Hungary spent less and less of its 
GDP on its already underfunded health care (Eurostat 2021b). Public 
education has suffered the same fate: teachers’ salaries are exceptionally 
low, work hours are increasing, educational segregation is officially 
endorsed and expenditure on education is declining in real value. The 
consequences are obvious: Hungary is doing poorly in international com-
parisons in life expectancy and especially healthy life expectancy, as well as 
in the performance of children in literacy and others skills tests. Hungary 
meets EU standards in access to childcare for children over three years of 
age, but is well below the recommended level for younger children. With 
the support of European Union funding, a small number of new nurseries 
have been built in the past years and others have been reclassified into this 
category to boost the numbers in international statistics. Yet the quality of 
childcare varies: childcare workers receive close to the minimum wage in a 
lot of nurseries, and access to care is extremely uneven geographically. 
Parents who live in more prosperous areas may find it easier to get a spot 
for their child, while parents in rural areas must travel far to find care.
Nowhere is austerity more obvious than in the allocation of social ben-
efits. Unemployment benefits have been drastically cut in length and gen-
erosity and the government has sought to replace payment with public 
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works programs. Social spending to support people in need has been 
reduced to the bare minimum, especially cash support for the vulnerable 
(Vastagh 2017). The only policy area where state spending has been 
boosted is “family protection”, specifically encouragement of and incen-
tives for married working couples to have more children (Rat and Szikra 
2018). I will discuss these measures, their logic and consequences in the 
next chapter.
gender regimeS of tHe PaSt
Orbán’s anti-liberal government may be unique in the intensity of its 
single- minded pronatalism but women’s social citizenship was, arguably, 
conditioned on their maternity in earlier times as well. In her now classic 
history of the Hungarian welfare state, Lynne Haney argues that from the 
late 1960s to the mid-1980s Hungarian women could make successful 
claims on the state on the basis of motherhood and protested vehemently 
the shift in emphasis toward material need as the main basis of claims mak-
ing in the 1990s (Haney 1997, 2002). This is just one, albeit central, 
feature of the state socialist gender regime which explains the seamlessness 
of the transition toward anti-liberalism. There are at least three further 
areas where I see notable continuities between Hungary’s state socialist 
legacy and our modern-day gender arrangements: women’s historically 
high participation in gender segregated paid work, their concomitant, 
unchanged responsibility for care work of both the paid and the unpaid 
kind, and a general disdain for feminism and independent civil organiza-
tions fighting for women’s rights.
First, a word on the concept of “gender regime” is in order. A gender 
regime is constituted by “patterns of gender arrangements”(Connell 
1987), which describe how members of a society are classified into groups 
designated as men and women, the distinct social roles and responsibilities 
assigned to each, their symbolic representations, along with the inequali-
ties built into these structures. All our social institutions are built on 
assumptions about and practices of gender: from the production process 
to reproduction, sexuality, institutions of politics and power, as well as 
emotions and cultural expressions. While gender may be manifested some-
what differently in each of these institutional arrangements, institutional 
gender regimes are deeply connected and in Connell’s terminology cohere 
into a societal level “gender order”, or following Walby’s terminology, a 
new form of patriarchy or “gender regime” (Walby 2020).
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State socialist countries developed new patterns of gender arrange-
ments after World War II under the leadership and supervision of the 
Soviet Union. At the time when, after the devastation of the war, Western 
European countries reveled in an increase in their birth rates and cele-
brated the stay-at-home housewife, women of all social classes were 
required to join the paid labor market in Hungary and in the other Central 
and East European states ruled by newly instituted communist parties. 
Women’s paid work was understood as essential for women’s emancipa-
tion according to the Marxist–Leninist doctrine. Not coincidentally, 
women’s contributions was also sorely needed in the intensive industrial-
ization project Central and Eastern European countries embarked upon 
after the destruction caused by World War II. Women’s potential had been 
a vastly underutilized resource (Csányi 2019; Zimmermann 2010). The 
main goal of early women’s emancipation policies was to cajole, and occa-
sionally to force women to take up paid work. After World War II, about 
a third of all women had been working for wages in Hungary (Gyáni 
1987) but by the end of the state socialist era this percentage climbed to 
over 75%. Similar rates were recorded in Nordic countries but, unlike 
there, in Hungary women worked full time all through their adult lives 
(Fodor 2021). Although employment levels plummeted after the collapse 
of state socialism and the attraction of the image of the middle-class stay- 
at- home housewife featured prominently in the imagination of many over-
worked Hungarians, material reality only really allowed the very few at the 
top of the social hierarchy to drop out of work voluntarily. Women’s full- 
time labor force participation in Hungary has varied but remained high 
overall for the past 70 years, indeed higher than in most EU countries 
when expressed in full-time equivalency rates (OECD 2019).
Inequalities at work were, however, rampant all through the state 
socialist period. Although data from the period are notoriously unreliable, 
researchers have found higher levels of occupational segregation in state 
socialist countries than in comparable capitalist ones during this period 
(Rosenfeld and Trappe 2002). In Hungary too, two-thirds of workers in 
sectors such as clothing or food production were women, and these jobs 
paid less than work in other sectors of the economy, which resulted in a 
wage gap that was measured at around 30% during the late state socialist 
era (Zimmermann 2010). This may have been somewhat compensated by 
the vast array of benefits in kind that workers received directly from the 
company they worked for, including kindergarten places, medical services, 
vacation home rentals and so on. Perhaps more importantly, 
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housing—rented at a nominal cost from the state for life—was at least 
partly allocated by employers, and families with children as well as single 
parents enjoyed some privileges (Scheiring 2020). In the case of a divorce, 
mothers were typically granted full custody over children and, as a conse-
quence, they also usually retained the right to the apartment. With a high 
divorce rate this led to difficult life circumstances and/or increased home-
lessness for men, as well as some financial advantage for women.
Similarly on the positive side, women’s education attainment increased 
noticeably under state socialism and this, along with their growing work 
experience, led to their more equal share in positions of mid-level author-
ity. Compared to neighboring Austria, which had started with a roughly 
similar gender regime after World War II but followed an altogether dif-
ferent route afterwards, women’s labor market advancement in state 
socialist Hungary was significant (Fodor 2003).
The need for women’s paid work has a long history in Hungary, as does 
the unequal division of household labor. Communist parties proclaimed 
their intention to socialize child and elderly care as well as domestic work. 
After World War II kindergartens were opened, children and adults were 
offered subsidized meals in school and factory canteens, laundry facilities 
were available at a low cost in larger cities and so on. None of these proved 
sufficient, however, to ease women’s reproductive burden to any signifi-
cant degree, especially not in the context of a general shortage of services 
and goods required for the maintenance of a household. Women, as time 
budget surveys and ethnographic accounts attest, worked long hours in 
their paid jobs followed by a lengthy second shift at home (Ghodsee 2005).
Some of the burden of reproductive work was alleviated by shared 
households. The proportion of multigenerational living arrangements was 
always higher in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe and 
remained so, partly because housing shortages had affected the whole 
state socialist period. But mobility from the countryside to the cities also 
increased, and mobile families could not draw on the contribution of older 
generations in care work. It is thus not surprising that the birth rate, high 
after World War II, started to drop precipitously soon afterwards, and by 
1959 Hungary’s total fertility rate dipped below what would have been 
required to keep population levels stable. Partly in response to these prob-
lems and partly because intensive industrialization slowed by the 
mid- 1960s, the logic of the communist party’s women’s emancipation 
policy shifted and even more of the care burden was moved to the realm 
of the family and onto the shoulders of women. Lengthy, paid maternity 
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leave opportunities were instituted in almost all countries in the region in 
the mid-1960s. In Hungary, new mothers (and mothers only) could with-
draw from paid work for up to three years upon childbirth and were guar-
anteed their jobs back upon return. Kindergarten places for children over 
three years of age as well as other social services related to childrearing 
became increasingly available and a balance was struck: it remained pri-
marily women’s responsibility to take care of children without much sup-
port from individual men but with some, typically in-kind, contributions 
from the state. In exchange, women continued to be employed as full- 
time workers. However, working for wages in the socialist economy 
proved significantly less demanding than in its capitalist counterpart: work 
hours were shorter, overtime less frequent and the expectation of work 
intensity varied. “We pretend to work, they [the state] pretend to pay us” 
was the popular joke of the time and women’s account of their work day 
often included doing the shopping in local shops or in the facilities within 
their work enterprises. Indeed, given the vast labor shortage and the polit-
ical guarantee of a paid job for everyone, except for smaller pockets of the 
population, among them, for example, the Roma minority in Hungary, 
people could fairly easily find a new job if they found that the conditions 
in a specific factory or office were incompatible with their domestic 
responsibilities.
Nevertheless, women worked significantly longer hours than men over-
all. To illustrate, a time budget survey taken in 1986 shows that among 
married couples with two children women spent 63  minutes a day on 
childcare and 227 minutes on domestic work for a total of 290 minutes. 
Fathers of two, on the other hand, dedicated only 61 minutes to these two 
types of activities combined. This 229-minute (almost 3.5 hours!) gap is 
not compensated for by the fact that men spent on average two more 
hours on doing paid work than women. Overall married mothers of two 
children had significantly less leisure time than similar men and a very 
long—almost ten-hour-workday altogether (KSH 2012). State socialist 
policies, except for a few initial steps in the early 1950s, mostly ignored the 
unfairness of this domestic division of labor.
Disdain for feminism, Western women’s movements and for the con-
ceptualization of women’s equality in terms of human rights is shared by 
anti-liberal and state socialist political regimes. While the notion of “wom-
en’s emancipation” was an acceptable formulation in Marxist–Leninist 
ideology, those working toward it could under no condition be called 
“feminists” (Barna et  al. 2018). State socialist policy makers banned 
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Western feminist literature, and confiscated it when they found intellectu-
als trying to smuggle it into the country. Achieving gender equality may 
have been an oft-repeated political goal, but it had to be initiated and car-
ried out on the terms of the Communist Party. Women’s grassroots orga-
nizations, numerous before World War II, were replaced by the Hungarian 
National Women’s Association, which historians argue, had some degree 
of independence but was far from a true representative of women’s inter-
ests nationally, and certainly did not invite a diversity of women’s voices to 
be heard (De Haan 2010; Funk 2014; Ghodsee and Mead 2018).
It is not surprising, therefore, that when Hungary joined the European 
Union, gender mainstreaming measures enforced by the accession require-
ments were not widely welcome (Kováts 2020). Indeed, in international 
surveys Hungarians tended to express more conservative gender role atti-
tudes than citizens of other countries in the Union (Pongracz 2005). 
Without much conviction, the socialist government of Hungary intro-
duced the necessary regulations and set up the required institutions that 
monitored the main indicators of gender equality, but popular support for 
the term or for women’s struggle in general was negligible. Small feminist 
groups worked toward specific goals, including violence against women, 
or reproductive rights, but funding primarily came from international 
organizations as did, often, the specific agenda and discourse (Fabian 
2014). The EU’s gender mainstreaming policies did not gain widespread 
popularity (Ghodsee 2005; Gregor and Grzebalska 2016).
In sum, women’s ongoing participation in paid work was necessary in 
both state socialist and post-state socialist gender regimes, but little real 
effort was made at redistributing or socializing care work. Not unrelated 
to this, neither the state socialist emancipation effort nor the EU’s hap-
hazardly enforced and rather limited gender mainstreaming agenda gener-
ated much enthusiasm for the concept of gender equality. It is no wonder 
that in 2010 Orbán’s new government could simply dismiss with impunity 
both the rhetoric and the reality of gender equality policies and assemble 
a new form of gender regime to support anti-liberal state building.
an anti-liBeral gender regime
But is this anti-liberal gender regime really new? I have identified a num-
ber of continuities with Hungary’s state socialist past and many of the 
policies I describe in the next chapter will be familiar from there or from 
elsewhere in the world. Sylvia Walby, for one, argues that the gender 
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regimes of authoritarian states are not necessarily unique. Walby (2020) 
traces the evolution of gender regimes (or forms of patriarchy) from what 
she calls “domestic” to “public”, and distinguishes at least two varieties of 
modern public gender regimes: neoliberal and social-democratic. She 
acknowledges the authoritarian turn in European politics but claims that 
authoritarianism is easily compatible with neoliberalism, so gender regimes 
of authoritarian states do not necessarily constitute a unique form. In a 
similar vein, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2015) claim that populist govern-
ments have diverse gender ideologies, left-wing in Latin- America, right-
wing in Western Europe, hence, they argue, the position of populists on 
gender issues is unclear and depends on the national context, it is not a 
unique variety of gender regimes. Perhaps what we are witnessing is simply 
a turn toward conservatism, characteristic of neo- patrimonial regimes, 
such as Orbán’s or Putin’s (Szelenyi and Csillag 2015)? Or the continua-
tion of the state socialist legacy of gender inequality? Csányi (2019) con-
nects the new regime’s emphasis on traditional gender roles with the 
exploitation of women’s cheap labor. He emphasizes the continuities from 
the 1950s, and describes the novelties emerging after 2010 as primarily in 
the realms of cultural representations. Or perhaps inconsistency and ambi-
guity are the defining features of Orbán’s gender policies (Kováts 2020; 
Szikra 2018)?
Yet others emphasize the coherence and uniqueness in the institution-
alization of gender inequality in the social fabric of countries which deny 
their allegiance to liberal democracy. Historical accounts, for example, 
point to similarities with “conservative authoritarian gender regimes” in 
Japan and Germany of the past (Shire and Nemoto 2020). Grzebalska and 
Pető (2018) claim that Hungary’s and Poland’s authoritarian govern-
ments have a unique “modus operandi” closely tied to their gender ide-
ologies, and highlight the foregrounding and mainstreaming of the family 
rather than gender equality policies (Juhász 2012), the appropriation of 
the space for fighting for gender equality, and the use of an anti-gender 
rhetoric to gather all political enemies under one umbrella (Kováts and 
Poim 2015). Krizsán and Roggeband (2018) also point to the closure of 
civil space for a gender equality agenda, the relationship between nativism 
and nationalism in policy making, and the weakening and elimination of 
women’s movements as common features of gender regimes in illib-
eral states.
I side with those who see a new variety of gender regime emerging. I 
argue that since the mid-2010s the government has redefined the problem 
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of care into one of demographic decline and proceeded to pass a policy 
package using principles of “carefare”. Carefare policies—to be described 
in more detail in the next chapter—discipline women into accepting an 
increased unpaid care work burden combined with unequal treatment in 
the labor market in exchange for economic survival or, in some cases, 
slight improvements in the financial position of their families. The govern-
ment’s gender policies aim to reorganize not just gender relations but 
social stratification itself by trickling down some limited resources to select 
“deserving” social groups, whose contributions to the economy is essen-
tial and whose votes and political loyalty the government is counting on. 
To legitimate these policies, the government increasingly relies on the 
rhetoric of global “anti-gender” movements.
Setting tHe Stage for State mandated PatriarcHy: 
anti-gender diScourSe in Hungary
Numerous authors describe the global spread of the rhetoric against “gen-
der ideology” and its important role in official political communication in 
Poland and Hungary (Korolczuk and Graff 2018; Kováts 2018; Kováts 
and Pető 2017; Kováts and Poim 2015). “Gender” in this context has 
come to signify political issues and affiliations well beyond the actual real-
ity of gender relations. In Hungary too, the Orbán government has suc-
cessfully divorced the term “gender” from actual policies about women’s 
and men’s social participation and turned it into a frenzied political rally-
ing cry. It is not alone in these efforts. Democratic backsliding in several 
countries (from Poland, Romania to Brazil and beyond) has been accom-
panied by state-sponsored propaganda which denies the usefulness of the 
concept “gender” in regulating women’s and men’s role in society (Kováts 
2018; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). This “anti-gender” discourse has 
common themes but a different focus in different countries, a phenome-
non, which supports the argument that it is primarily a political tool, a 
“symbolic glue” which holds allies, enemies and topical political themes 
together (Kováts and Poim 2015). I will briefly indicate a few elements of 
the Hungarian variety here and argue that, even though the discourse is 
not about gender relations, the use of this rhetoric has a lot to do with 
gender: it sets the stage for ignoring gender equality policies and reinforc-
ing state mandated gender inequality.
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Hungary is a relative late comer to the anti-gender scene, but the 
deployment of the concept of “gender” has accelerated in the past few 
years and is fiercely ongoing at the time of writing this book. Even a cur-
sory analysis of a FIDESZ-owned, self-proclaimed pro-government 
national newspaper, Magyar Idok̋ (in English Hungarian Times, later 
renamed Magyar Nemzet, or Hungarian Nation) illustrates this point. As 
Fig.  1.1 shows, Magyar Idok̋’s online portal published only 20 articles 
which used the term “gender” in 2015, while by 2020 a whopping 281 
appeared in the paper. (Another pro-government outlet, Origo, also 
increased its attention to gender going from publishing 18 articles, which 
mention the term “gender” in 2017, to 32 articles in 2018, to 50 in 2019 
and 65 in 2020.)
Magyar Idok̋/Magyar Nemzet’s output represents a more than ten-fold 
increase within a five-year period between 2015 and 2020 and one which 
meant that the term gender has been used almost daily on the portal for 
the past three years. The government whose self-proclaimed goal is to 
eliminate “gender”, and whose representatives deny its very existence, 
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Fig. 1.1 The number of articles which mention the term “gender” in Magyar 
Idők/Magyar Nemzet
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This increased usage does not mean, however, an intensification in pub-
lic discussions about gender relations. Partly in an effort to avoid just that, 
the government has emptied the meaning of “gender” as a concept signi-
fying relationships and systemic inequalities between men and women, 
and has repurposed it for use to distinguish and legitimize its politi-
cal agenda.
I read, coded and analyzed 156 articles published on the online portal 
of the newspaper in the months of February, May and December of 2018, 
2019 and 2020 to get a sense of the government’s message and overall 
understanding of the term “gender”. During these three years the term 
gender almost never referred to relationships between men and women. 
Indeed, as Fig. 1.2 shows, individual women or even women as a group 
are practically never mentioned in the 155 articles, and in only 15, fewer 
than 10%, is there any discussion of gender inequality or women’s social 
position. Most of these 15 address issues of violence, only 3 mention labor 
market status or social welfare. Even motherhood or parenting is not on 
the agenda, only the abstract term “family” features with regularity.
Instead, “gender” was most prominently used during these three years 
to weave a story about migration and Hungary’s struggle against the 
European Union’s migration quota. Figure 1.2 demonstrates this claim. 
In 2018 43.6%, in 2019 41.4% and in 2020 47.1% of all articles which 
contained the term “gender” also mentioned migrations and migrants. 






















aggressive propaganda about gender and migration” (December 26, 
2020) threatening the integrity of the Hungarian nation in one of its arti-
cles during the Christmas period. In a similar vein, an article two weeks 
later assures the public that “Hungary … resists the integration of masses 
of migrants and the gender craze” (Jan. 13, 2021) emanating from 
the West.
The European Union features prominently: 44% of all articles which 
mention the term “gender” also cite the EU, typically as a pro-gender 
enemy of the Hungarian nation. A single example suffices to illustrate this 
from an article published on December 14, 2020: “I was reminded: the 
gender lobby is hard at work and as part of the migration action plan 34 
million migrants will get voting rights in the EU” (December 14, 2020). 
The relationship between the “gender lobby” and the “migration lobby” 
is not made explicit, the two are used simultaneously, indicating that they 
are the same or at least the same people are behind both. The blame for 
the EU’s migration policy falls on the shoulder of the “gender lobby”. 
Along the lines of what researchers have described elsewhere gender poli-
cies or gender ideology is simply used as a way to identify the “enemy”, 
the “other side” or “left-liberal forces”, specifically those who seek to 
impose migrants on the country (ibid.).
Gender ideology—if defined—refers to the acceptance of transgender 
people as legitimate members of society. The Hungarian government and 
its propaganda machines are openly and increasingly homophobic and 
reject all forms of sexual identities which are not hetero. Homosexuality is 
in fact seen as analogous to the problem of migration: several of the EU’s 
norms, including those related to gender and migration, are understood 
as detrimental to Hungarian’s values and as externally imposed and alien 
(Korolczuk and Graff 2018). Increasingly during the three years, stories 
about sex changes and variability in gender identity are problematized, 
laying the groundwork for various policies on the theme, including 
Hungary’s ban on sex change, the prohibition of adoption by non- 
heterosexuals or the reinforcement of gender stereotypes in education. It 
is no wonder that OECD statistics from 2018 show that Hungarians are 
the least tolerant of all OECD countries toward ethnic, sexual and reli-
gious minorities, a sharp increase from 2008 when the views expressed by 
Hungarians were no different from the average. Gender is one, although 
not the only, political tool to construct an external enemy and mobilize for 
resistance against it.
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The concept of “gender” is thus used by Hungary’s top-level politi-
cians and government-controlled media to reinforce, communicate and 
persuade the population about their anti-liberal agenda. Depicted as a 
“foreign” concept—hence the use of the English term gender—it is stead-
fastly associated with other themes in the government’s political repertoire 
and is described as dangerous to Hungarians, indeed to the fate of civiliza-
tion itself. The government is thus tasked to reject these agents of evil and, 
as David against the Goliath of Brussels, to fight for the ultimate good of 
all against the “gender lobbies”, “genderism” and the “gender ideology”.
Indeed, much of this discourse is not directly about gender or gender 
equality. But it does serve the purpose of taking attention away from gen-
der equality policies and the possibility of claiming rights for women as 
women. The government has successfully tied the concept of gender 
equality to “liberalism”, that is, politicized it and associated it with a spe-
cific side of the political spectrum. As it is rejecting liberalism, it can thus 
legitimately and without further explanation reject gender equality poli-
cies as well. Note the close association between “gender ideology” and 
“liberal open society” in the text of Hungary’s Minister of Justice, Judit 
Varga in a Facebook post on February 1, 2021: “We experience with great 
concern the breakthrough of the liberal open society. … Religion, nation, 
traditional family model … traditions have no place in that. … Instead, 
there is gender ideology, Christian persecution, a technological dictator-
ship of opinion, destruction of nations, and the creation of a grey uniform 
society in which everyone must be liberal and an individuality” (the trans-
lation is from the original post available online).
outline of tHe Book and a Brief exPlanation 
of reSearcH metHodS
This book utilizes original data from several research projects I have con-
ducted over the past six years. Chapter 2 explains the concept of carefare: 
its manifestations in social policy and political discourse, as well as some of 
its consequences for social and especially gender inequalities. To make the 
case I primarily rely on data from aggregate sources, such as Hungary’s 
Central Statistical Office, OECD and Eurostat datasets. In addition, I 
present results from statistical analyses of data from the dataset EU SILC 
from the years 2011 and 2017. The European Union Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU SILC) is a harmonized, annually collected 
EU-wide survey with a large enough case number to allow the analysis of 
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smaller social groups. I use it to measure what is called the “motherhood 
penalty” in Hungary and its change over time.
The third form of data come from a series of interviews I conducted 
with my colleague, Christy Glass over a decade-long exploration of the 
motherhood penalty in Hungarian firms, the nuances and conditions of its 
application, as well as how it is experienced (Fodor et al. 2019; Fodor and 
Glass 2018; Glass and Fodor 2007, 2011, 2018). The most recent series 
of interviews took place in 2019 when we talked with 24 mothers working 
in state administration, who responded to questions about the cut in vaca-
tion days and the lengthening of work hours, measures introduced simul-
taneously with the government’s new pronatalist family policies. We 
sought to find out how this group of young professional women, who are 
clearly targeted by the family policies, evaluate their significance from their 
own points of view.
Finally, in Chap. 2 I also present data from my analysis of a document 
published on the occasion of the International Women’s Day in 2019 by a 
government funded organization called FICSAK, “Organization for 
Young Families” (FICSAK 2019). In this heavily subsidized and promoted 
booklet, high-level Hungarian male politicians and a handful of public 
personalities offer greetings to women to celebrate the occasion. I only 
used the quotes from politicians, ignoring otherwise famed participants, 
but politicians represented the majority. Each quote—altogether 90 of 
them—is a few paragraphs long and they are collected in a booklet entitled 
Women’s Soul as Seen Through Male Eyes. These texts highlight better than 
most other documents what role is assigned to women, what achieve-
ments and character traits are praised most by top-level policy makers. I 
coded the quotes by theme and will cite the relevant sections in the next 
chapter.
Chapter 3 describes how principles of carefare are realized in practice in 
the special context of Hungary’s child protection system, and specifically 
among foster care workers. Orbán’s government transformed this area of 
social service through a new piece of legislation in 2014 and the process 
and its outcome illustrate brilliantly several aspects of the workings of a 
carefare state. I started studying the work of foster parents in 2015. During 
the past six years I conducted over 80 interviews with various actors in the 
foster care system, most importantly with 52 foster parents living in Pest 
county, in and near Budapest, as well as in a handful of small towns and 
villages in the north-east of Hungary. These areas are two of the most 
populous in terms of foster families. They are also quite different: I 
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interviewed in the poorest and ethnically most diverse region of Hungary 
as well as in better-off areas around the capital. I initially got in touch with 
foster parents through their agencies, so I first talked to those who were 
preselected possibly for their performance or easy collaboration with the 
agency. But I gained further contacts from the foster parents themselves so 
I could broaden the circle of interviewees. Nevertheless, I most likely con-
ducted interviews with foster parents who were generally satisfied with 
and proud of their work, in addition to a few who held a major grudge and 
wanted to talk about that. Most interviews were conducted in the home 
of the foster parent and lasted between 90 and 180 minutes. Foster par-
ents are used to having strangers in their homes who ask about their lives, 
so they have also developed strategies to respond in a way that preserves 
their privacy and dignity. But most people who visit them ask about their 
children and I was interested in them as workers, their daily routines, their 
experience, their lives and choices. This was a novel experience for many 
who felt underappreciated as workers and parents, so they typically wel-
comed the chance to talk. I taped and transcribed the interviews and ana-
lyzed them using the software NVivo. Names and minor demographic 
details have been changed to preserve anonymity.
In addition to talking to foster parents, I conducted regular participant 
observations in two large foster parent agencies during birth-parent-foster 
child visitations, and helped out at other events at one of the agencies dur-
ing the years of 2015–2016. I interviewed over 30 foster care advisors and 
various actors in the child protection system, including policy experts, 
managers of foster parent networks and politicians in Ministries who were 
in charge of the transformation of the system. I obtained data from the 
Central Statistical Office, the Hungarian Treasury and the Ministry of 
Economics. Experts and policy makers provided me with numerous docu-
ments which were also used for the analysis.
Next, let’s explore the concept of carefare.
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Abstract Hungary’s anti-liberal government has invented a novel solu-
tion to the care crisis, which I call a “carefare regime”. This chapter 
describes four key features of the policies, policy practice and discourse 
that make up Hungary’s carefare regime. I argue that in contrast to wel-
fare state models familiar from developed democracies, in post-2010 
Hungary, women’s claims to social citizenship are most successfully made 
on the basis of doing care work. The state is re-engineered rather 
retrenched: services are not commodified but “churchified” in an effort to 
redistribute resources and build political loyalty. Women are constructed 
as “naturally” responsible for reproduction and care and this responsibility 
is tied to sentimentalized notions about femininity and true womanhood. 
In addition to providing care in the household, women are increasingly 
engaged in the paid labor market too, where the tolerance for gender 
inequality is officially mandated. A carefare regime provides limited finan-
cial advantages for a select group of women, while simultaneously increas-
ing their devalued work burden both in and outside the household: it 
feeds a growing underclass of women workers.
Keywords Care crisis • Welfare regimes • De-familialization • 
Re-familialization • Carefare • Wage gap • Labor market • Gender 
inequality • Social citizenship • Demography • Family policies
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“And I hope that you—yes, you—have the ambition to lean in to your 
career and run the world. Because the world needs you to change it.” Sheryl 
Sandberg, Lean in: Women, Work and the Will to Lead (2013)
“Do not believe that we, women must always compete with men. Do not 
believe that we must compete in every moment of our lives, or that we must 
have the same position, the same salary as them … let’s be happy that we 
were born women. … Let’s be happy that we were given the gift of being 
able to love and take care of others.” Katalin Novák, Minister for Families in 
Hungary in a video message to women, (HVG 2020)
Over the past decade and a half the problem of the care crisis has gained 
traction in both the academic literature and in popular media (Ehrenreich 
and Hochschield 2004; Rosen 2007; Williams 2018). Recently, Nancy 
Fraser (2016) has argued emphatically that a “crisis of care” was looming 
in western capitalist societies caused by the increasingly unresolvable con-
flict between the logic of social reproduction and that of aggressive capital 
accumulation. Fraser points out that although capitalist production 
requires healthy, socially apt and highly skilled human beings to meet its 
ever-growing profit targets, the work that goes into producing these indi-
viduals and the communities in which they thrive, that is, the work of 
social reproduction, has become devalued to the extreme by the very same 
logic of accumulation. Financialized neoliberal capitalism, she claims, has 
aggravated the above contradiction to the point of an inevitable explosion, 
although Fraser muses about the possibility of the emergence of creative 
“mutant” regimes, which would offer temporary solutions to patch up 
evolving crisis tendencies.
Hungary’s anti-liberal gender regime is such a mutant. I argue that 
since the mid-2010s the Hungarian government has been offering a novel 
response to the care crisis, one which is successful in generating a sufficient 
degree of political legitimacy even in the face of growing inequalities and 
social disintegration. I call Hungary’s anti-liberal solution a “carefare” 
regime. Carefare is a form of state response to the care crisis, a set of social 
policies, policy implementation and related discourse within an anti-liberal 
political culture and an authoritarian capitalist economy. Carefare is not 
the only possible anti-liberal response to the crisis of care, but it is certainly 
one of them and a successful mutant at least in the short run.
Below I discuss in detail four features which jointly distinguish “care-
fare”, Hungary’s response to the crisis of care, from the generic model of 
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the “two-earner family”, found, with variations, in numerous western 
countries guided by principles of neoliberalization (Fraser 2016; Walby 
2020). None of the elements of carefare are particularly new. Indeed, sev-
eral authors point out the direct links and similarities between elements of 
anti-liberal and neoliberal governance (Jessop 2019; Scheiring 2020). Yet 
the combination of these features results in a unique discursive interpreta-
tion of the care problem and a set of social policies, which do, in fact 
represent a novel answer. Table 2.1 below summarizes the four set of fea-
tures in comparison. After a short discussion of the history of anxieties 
about the size of the population in Hungary, I explain and provide evi-
dence for each in the rest of this chapter.
First, in a neoliberal capitalist welfare state, successful claims on the 
state are made on the basis of social insurance and, secondarily, material 
need. These constitute the bases of social citizenship. Doing unpaid care 
work does not carry a social insurance scheme, and claims to the state can-
not be made on the basis of raising children, or being good parents. This 
is indeed the crux of the conflict between production and reproduction 
(Fraser 2016). In Hungary, however, care work has become a centrally 
important axis of social citizenship claims. Second, anti-liberal states are 
Table 2.1 A comparison of the logics of carefare versus the “two-earner fam-
ily” model
“Two-earner family” “Carefare”
Basis for claiming 
social citizenship 
rights
Social insurance and 
means tests
Claims as individuals
Care work is combined with waged work
Claims by heterosexual families







“Churchify” instead of commodify
Responsibility for 
care work
Either externalized to 
family or commodified 
by global care chain
Reproductive work is 
seen as a yoke that 
holds women back
Falls on native women, absolutely not on 
immigrant labor
Reproductive work within heterosexual 
working families is what gives meaning to 
life for women and is their responsibility 
toward their families/the nation
Who works for 
wages?
Is gender equality 
important?
Women are expected to 
work, and “lean in”
Equality measures exist
Diversity is celebrated
Women are encouraged to work but not 
“lean in”
Gender equality policies are rejected, 
replaced by sentimentalization of work
Gender inequality is acceptable
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powerful and extensive, unlike their neoliberal counterparts which tend to 
disinvest in general and in social reproduction in particular. Hungary’s 
anti-liberal state has increased already generous funding for several impor-
tant aspects of social reproduction. In addition, instead of commodifying 
and marketizing previously state provided services in an effort to cut costs, 
it directs centralized state funding in a way as to maximize not profit or 
cost-cutting but political loyalty. Third, in Hungary care for children and 
the elderly is enthusiastically and selectively familialized. State policies 
assign care work to women and identify the heterosexual family home as 
its principal location. In neoliberal regimes, care work is increasingly out-
sourced to vulnerable, often immigrant domestic workers, to market- 
based providers, and/or to state institutions. The main focus of policy 
objectives is typically to ensure that native, working age women do less 
care work, while in Hungary the opposite is the case. A political discourse 
which associates care with women’s “natural” essence supports this pro-
cess. Fourth, in addition to doing care work in the home, women are also 
incentivized to do waged work. This is done through tying reproduction 
related social benefits to work history and family income levels in addition 
to care work. This necessitates a dual earner couple. But state provisions 
do not address work–life balance problems, and gender equality measures 
are summarily rejected by Hungary’s anti-liberal political leaders. A truly 
vicious trade-off is emerging where women must accept inferior work con-
ditions in exchange for the possibility to meet care responsibilities. This is 
especially problematic for women in the lower educational brackets and 
those living in rural areas where work options are limited.
One consequence of carefare is obvious: it increases women’s work bur-
den while leaving men’s untouched. In addition, carefare reinforces and 
exacerbates class inequalities because better-off families can utilize more of 
the income-based provisions than those with lower wages. At the same 
time, however, the logic of carefare rearranges patterns of socio-economic 
disadvantage at the bottom of the social hierarchy too. Pronatalist provi-
sions boost the wellbeing of specific working class groups: those who have 
several children and some semblance of formal employment. These fami-
lies have suffered vast social disadvantages in the past. Carefare promotes 
them into the category of “deserving families” and legitimizes their suc-
cessful claims to social benefits. It is to these families that some of the 
economic growth gains and EU funding trickle down, even amidst grow-
ing overall social inequalities. If authoritarian policies serve as a political 
strategy to overcome conflicts generated by the growing inequalities of 
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neoliberal capitalism (Scheiring 2020), carefare serves the same purpose 
via different means.
“Care Crisis” as a DemographiC Crisis in hungary
Hungarian policy makers have long acknowledged a pervasive crisis of care 
but only in one area of reproduction: the declining number of births to 
Hungarian women which they closely associated with the impending 
death of the Hungarian nation. Indeed, defining the declining birth rate 
of the native population as a “demographic crisis” is well known in 
European Union-wide thinking as well, although policy recommendations 
from the EU include a variety of measures which could potentially reduce 
the burden of care work on women. As I will show below this was not the 
direction the Hungarian government took.
To understand this rather narrow re-conceptualization of the problem 
of care, we need to understand the lengthy history of deep-seated anxieties 
about the size of the population in the country. Hungary is a small coun-
try of about 10 million people and this number has been shrinking steadily 
since 1981. The total fertility rate (TFR) has not reached what is typically 
considered sufficient for reproduction since 1959 (KSH 2019a). In this 
regard, Hungary’s demographic characteristics are quite similar to those 
of many other post-socialist countries, which started to experience a 
decline in births in the 1950s. This then continued steadily throughout 
the twentieth century with a sharper drop in the fertility rate in the early 
1990s after the collapse of state socialism, which brought about a deep 
economic crisis and major societal upheaval. Two decades later, the reces-
sion of 2008 produced even more societal stress all over the region and 
resulted in a further decline in fertility in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. Soon, however, total fertility rates began to increase in all post- 
state socialist countries, with Hungary lagging somewhat behind, but 
picking up speed by 2013. In 2019, Hungary’s total fertility rate was in 
line with that of the EU 27, even if the number of births had not shown a 
similar increase due to the smaller size of the cohort in reproductive age in 
the late 2010s (Eurostat 2018a; KSH 2019a).
Although Hungary’s fertility rate is not significantly different from that 
of other Central and East European countries, or even the EU 27 average, 
the country’s crude death rate is one of the highest in the European 
Union, and life expectancy, as well as healthy life expectancy, is one of the 
lowest (Eurostat 2018b). Indeed, all Visegrád 4 countries exceed Hungary 
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in life expectancy and only Romanian and Bulgarian women die younger 
than Hungarians within the Union (ibid.). On the plus side, this is one of 
the reasons why Hungary’s old age dependency ratio is somewhat lower 
than the EU average of roughly 30%. Hungarian policy makers have 
mostly ignored the problem of early deaths and conceptualized the demo-
graphic crisis primarily as a threat to Hungarian nationhood and only sec-
ondarily as a potential human resource shortage.
anxieties about populations
Biopolitical concerns about the size and quality of the population have 
long plagued Hungarian political discourse (Melegh 2019). The country 
lost a great deal of its territories and over half of its population following 
World War I—some to the damages of the war itself, most to the dictates 
of the post-war Treaty of Trianon. The pain of the war loss intensified 
debates about demography and specifically about the phenomenon of the 
“single child” popular in rural households in certain regions in Hungary 
(Andorka 1975). The anxiety about the size of the population was explic-
itly connected by politicians, writers and public figures alike with the 
future of the Hungarian nation and the looming threat of German inva-
sion (Heller et al. 2015).
After World War II even though war losses were significant, discussions 
about demography were silenced for a while, as issues related to industri-
alization, war recovery and an ideological commitment to the fight of the 
international rather than the national proletariat were considered more 
important by the leaders of the Communist Party. However, by the mid-
dle of the 1950s, when the post-war baby boom failed to materialize in 
Hungary, the government decided to take a radical step and banned abor-
tions altogether (Pongráczné 1999). The number of births increased tem-
porarily but political pressure forced the government to abandon the 
measure in 1956. In the absence of other types of contraceptives, abortion 
became the primary form of birth control for Hungarian women: between 
1960 and 1973 the number of abortions, legal and accessible, exceeded 
the number of births (KSH 2019a).
After the revolution of 1956, the Hungarian government’s population 
policy started to lean toward incentives rather than prohibition. In 1967, 
a three-year paid maternity leave was introduced as a way to encourage 
births and also to regulate the labor market. But as a backlash against per-
missive abortion regulations and the extremely high number of 
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procedures, the government created a new population policy in the early 
1970s, which added a set of restrictive measures as well. Around this time 
an extensive public debate took place on the pages of Hungarian maga-
zines and weeklies. Public figures, writers, sociologists and demographers 
expressed concern about the developments in population trend, linking 
the problem of fertility decline to classic tropes ranging from the death of 
the nation and the disappearance of Hungarians from the planet, to moral 
concerns about abortions, the idyllic image of large healthy families of the 
past, as well as to the relationship between women’s emancipation and 
labor force participation and their willingness, inclination and ability to 
produce more children (Heller et  al. 2015). Current definitions of the 
problem of care resonate deeply with many of these ideas.
Population concerns were not limited to Hungary, of course, but in the 
1970s and 1980s the primary global concern was the “population bomb” 
rather than depopulation. It was after the turn of the twenty-first century 
that the issue of demography came to the attention of policy makers in the 
European Union.1 As the first cohort of baby boomers entered retirement 
age and looked forward to decades of happy retirement, the notion of old 
age dependency came to be conceptualized as a looming problem. The 
size of the EU’s population started to shrink in 2015 prompting further 
discussions about depopulation, the cost of aging and population 
projections.
Although nationhood, national identity and demography had been 
points of interest for the Orbán government immediately after its acces-
sion to power in 2010, it was the refugee crisis of 2015 which cast the 
population problem in an altogether different light and allowed it to gain 
the political momentum to profoundly change social policy. In the sum-
mer of 2015, a large wave of refugees entered Hungary. In average years 
about 2000–3000 people sought asylum in the country, by early fall of 
2015 the number was close to 180,000 (KSH 2019b). Refugees from 
Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, Iraq and Kosovo arrived in Budapest, submit-
ted their request for asylum status but moved on toward more prosperous 
and inclusive parts of Europe, such as Germany, France or the UK. The 
flood of asylum seekers entering the EU through the Serbian–Hungarian 
border took the country by surprise and no humanitarian support was 
1 I want to thank Zsolt Spéder (head of the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute) 
for his lengthy consultation with me on topics related to population policy in Hungary and 
globally. See also Melegh (2019).
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forthcoming. Instead, the Hungarian government constructed the notion 
of the “refugee crisis”, built a wall to restrict entry on the southern border 
and started a country-wide propaganda campaign which depicted refugees 
and migrants as potential terrorists and threats to the social and cultural 
wellbeing of all. A second propaganda campaign demonized George 
Soros, and argued that he, with the complicity—even direct assistance—of 
key politicians in the European Union encouraged and funded migration 
in an effort to destroy the purity of European Christianity. Hungarian 
politicians were not ashamed of their openly racist and xenophobic mes-
saging which had the expected influence: Hungarians developed a real and 
measurable fear of the person of the “refugee”, even though most of them 
had never actually met one in their lives. Within three years, the number 
of asylum seekers plummeted to levels well below those pre-2015, yet the 
government kept up its anti-immigration xenophobia.
It is against this backdrop that Orbán’s government decided to tackle 
the crisis of care by foregrounding the problem of the demographic crisis 
at the cost of any other issues related to the problem of care. “We want 
more children, not migrants” said Hungary’s prime minister as part of his 
re-election campaign in March 2018 (Erdély.ma 2018), and Hungarians 
found this call appealing. In 2018 Orbán won his third election victory 
and gained a qualified majority in Parliament. The scene was set for the 
final development of the carefare regime.
soCial Citizenship Claims in Carefare regimes
In her now classic account of the history of the Hungarian welfare state, 
Lynne Haney (2002) notes a shift around 1985  in the “architecture of 
need” that underpins the logic of social citizenship. Before the mid-1980s 
claims to the state socialist welfare state were most successfully made on 
the basis of maternity. State socialist social policies and centralized redistri-
bution guaranteed that women with the same number of children received 
the same amount and types of subsidies regardless of other circumstances, 
such as need or work status. In my previous work I argued, in agreement 
with Haney, that women during state socialism were constructed as a 
“corporate” group, with specific skills and unique contributions to society, 
typically maternity. This guaranteed specific rights and privileges, different 
from those of the group of men (Fodor 2003).
But in the mid-1980s these “maternalist” principles changed toward 
what Haney calls “materialist” ones. She argues that instead of 
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motherhood, material needs came to be seen as the basis of social citizen-
ship: new measures were introduced that targeted the group newly defined 
as needy, state provisions were allocated on the basis of material need, 
evaluated by local rather than central governments and in a way that dif-
ferentiated among women, rather than offering similar support to all in 
the same care work or parental category. Means tests were utilized and 
benefits favored those who had paid social insurance, although benefit 
levels differed according to other characteristics too, such as the length 
and type of previous employment or education. Overall, subsidies were cut 
back significantly, or they lost their real value in the context of inflation 
and became subject to political struggles. “Child rearing was no longer 
considered a social responsibility deserving remuneration; women were no 
longer guaranteed compensation for their maternal labor; and claims to 
state assistance were no longer framed around one’s contribution as a 
worker, mother, or family member … women would be recognized only 
as ‘needy’ individuals” (Haney 2002: 189).
“Materialist” welfare principles are part of the logic of neoliberal state-
craft; and neoliberal-leaning capitalism was understood in the early 1990s 
as the brightest possible future for the country. Notably, as distinct from 
membership in the corporate group of women (i.e., potential, present or 
past mothers), neoliberal citizenship rests on the notion of the individual. 
As Rose (1998: 165) put it, “The political subject is … an individual 
whose citizenship is manifested through the free exercise of personal 
choice amongst a variety of options”. Individuals are expected to develop 
their human capacities in order to compete successfully on various markets 
and they must strive to rely on these markets to satisfy their needs. The 
state is of minimal importance, providing financial support only in cases of 
dire need.
Anti-liberal Hungary moved away from this individual-based principle 
of social citizenship. In Orbán’s “carefare” state claims to the state can 
again be made on the basis of membership in a community, specifically the 
family and, indirectly, the nation. (This is not the only basis of claims mak-
ing but certainly a new and very significant one.) In the words of László 
Kövér, the President of the Hungarian Parliament, “Who is a decent 
Hungarian citizen? Not someone who speaks Hungarian. It is someone 
who has 3–4 children, 9–12 grandchildren, they all speak Hungarian and 
are committed to the Hungarian nation” (László Kövér’s speech in 
Gyergyószentmiklós, August 2019). In his interpretation, citizenship—
including social citizenship—is based on active membership in a fertile, 
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populous family. Government policies have been duly transformed to 
reflect this principle.
A quick review of the regulations introduced between 2014 and 2020 
makes clear the explicit goal of encouraging childbearing—as well as the 
additional requirement of parents’ participation in paid work. I have enu-
merated the very long list of the main policies—both new and old—in the 
appendix. Column 1 identifies the basis of receiving the benefit. Note that 
the state has eliminated, shortened, cut or devalued all universal cash ben-
efits paid to people as a citizenship right. As an example, see the backbone 
of family protection legislations since the mid-1960s, the flat rate three- 
year parental leave allowance (line 3 in the table in the appendix). For the 
past several decades this has been the main social benefit available to new 
parents, which allowed mostly mothers to withdraw from paid work for up 
to three years after childbirth to raise children. Parents receive a lump sum 
payment, retain social insurance and the promise of their jobs back upon 
return. Parental leave is an extremely popular measure in Hungary, where 
the majority of the population is convinced that children do best if they 
are raised at home by their mothers until age 3 (Blaskó 2011). Only one 
government attempted to abolish the three-year leave as part of a broader 
austerity package, but the policy was soon reinstated. The actual sum the 
participating parent receives equals the minimum old age pension in 
Hungary, which has been set at 28,500 HUF (or less than 80 EUR) since 
2008. At that time in 2008, the parental leave benefit represented 41% of 
the national minimum wage, while in 2020 it amounts to only 18% (and 
about 7% of the average wage). To counter any hope that this may be 
adjusted, the government additionally passed a regulation which essen-
tially froze the value of the minimum pension/parental leave benefit at 
this level forever (Government decree 707/2020. (XII.30); Portfolió, 
2021). At the same time a different type of parental leave benefit has been 
raised generously: the one that mothers with formal employment can 
claim for the first six months of their leaves. The government has boosted 
the value and conditions of insurance-based parental leave options, while 
allowing the universal flat—rate benefit to devalue.
To complement the parental leave allowance, the “family benefit” has 
served to support families raising children since before World War II. The 
regulations and eligibility criteria of the family benefit have changed sev-
eral times over the years, but it has been a universal support scheme since 
1998 (Spéder et al. 2020). However, its value has fluctuated significantly. 
At the end of the state socialist period in 1989 it represented 21% of the 
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average wage per child, which was a significant contribution to the family 
budget. It was devalued after 1990, then adjusted during the reign of the 
Socialist government in 2008. Since then, neither the Socialist govern-
ment in power until 2010, nor Orbán who took over in the spring of that 
year, has changed the amount of support allocated per child. This means 
that in 2019 the benefit for a single child amounted to less than 5% of the 
average net wage (author’s calculations based on data from Central 
Statistical Office, and Jarvis and Miklewright 1992). Both major universal 
benefits—the three-year parental allowance and the family benefit—which 
people receive without consideration of class or work status have lost a 
significant portion of their values and the government has announced that 
it has no plans to change this. Several other types of social provisions met 
the same fate (Scharle and Szikra 2015).
Successful claims on the state are nowadays made on the basis of signifi-
cant care work combined with some employment history. Claim makers 
are typically “families” (defined as heterosexual married couples with chil-
dren and employed in the formal economy) rather than individuals. The 
first and most significant of new family benefits is the earned income tax 
credit, which was re-introduced in 2011. On its official webpage, the gov-
ernment describes it as reflecting two basic values: “work and childcare 
done in addition to paid work”. Note the emphasis on the combination of 
care work and paid work—this is certainly not a traditional “back to the 
kitchen” ideology! Working parents can claim a portion of their taxes 
back, which in 2021 could yield, at the maximum 33,000 HUF per month 
(about 100 EUR) per child if a family has at least three children. The tax 
break is significantly smaller per child if the family has fewer children, 
which is not surprising since the government has an openly pronatalist 
agenda and the measure is meant to encourage childbirth. The goal is in 
fact noble: demographers had long argued that Hungarians wanted more 
children than they would actually end up giving birth to, so the govern-
ment claimed that it sought to redress this problem and enable families to 
have as many babies as they desired (Kapitány et al. 2019). But earned 
income tax credits can only be claimed by those in formal employment, 
and informal work arrangements are widespread in Hungary (Hegedűs 
2020). In addition, the total family income from formal employment must 
exceed a certain level, otherwise parts of the tax break are lost. In 2019, 
families had to have a joint income of at least 330,000 HUF, which was 
about 10% lower than the average gross wage for full-time work for one 
person. Recent studies, however, show that about 40% of employees are 
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registered at the minimum wage in Hungary, although they may or may 
not receive additional income “under the table” (Hornyák 2019). The 
minimum wage was 149,000 HUF per months in 2019, so even two par-
ents working full time on the minimum wage were not eligible for the full 
sum. If parents divorced—and about a third of marriages end up in divorce 
in their first 15 years (Makay and Szabó 2018), only one party can claim 
the tax credit, typically mothers, whose income alone may not be enough 
to receive the full sum. Nevertheless, a significant number of families can 
and do utilize these earned income tax credits—the precise number is 
simply not available. Those without employment or formal employment 
are not eligible. Following a similar logic, working mothers of four or 
more children do not pay income tax—a benefit that is tied to both paid 
work in the formal economy and significant care work responsibilities.
In addition to the tax credit, married couples can take a variety of loans 
which do not have to be paid back if they give birth to the requisite num-
ber of children. The centerpiece is a 10 million HUF loan (about 27,000 
EUR, introduced in 2019) for couples who plan to have children. The 
loan can be used for any purpose and a portion is forgiven after the second 
child. It turns into a non-repayable grant once the third child is born. 
Couples do not pay interest in the first five years, or at all once they have 
their first child. Significantly, this is a loan, which can only be taken if at 
least someone from the family has a three-year work history, a sizeable 
formal income, and if the couple is married. Its value, as must be obvious 
from the above, far exceeds that of the flat rate family benefit.
A second set of provisions helps “families” buy, build or renovate their 
homes. If married couples promise to have children, they become eligible 
for a grant to be spent on real estate, the size of which is dependent on the 
number of children they have, or promise to have, and the qualities of the 
home. There are additional subsidized loan opportunities, mortgage 
reduction and a handful of other variations on this benefit. The main point 
is that they are all tied to employment, being married if the couple has no 
children yet, age (she has to be under 40), and the couple must have sig-
nificant resources of their own because the state subsidies are not enough 
in and of themselves to buy/build or even renovate any real estate. 
Interestingly, there is a special provision for those who want to build a 
multigenerational home, which the government encourages and offers 
special subsidies for. Grandparents are encouraged to be involved in care 
work via other means as well: they can take parental leave instead of the 
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birth parents of the child. In that case, however, not only the grandparent 
but both parents of the child must be insured, thus working for wages.
All combined these provisions target married couples with some formal 
employment and savings of their own, who have or plan to have at least 
two or more children. The sum they can claim from the state is sizeable, 
while provisions available outside this social category are lower and disap-
pearing. In Hungary’s state socialist “maternalist” welfare regime, moth-
ers of all social categories received similar benefits regardless of employment, 
marital status or social class. Social citizenship claims in Hungary’s carefare 
regime, on the other hand, are conditioned on a combination of criteria 
related both to formal employment and to unpaid care work done within 
a married couple family.
seleCtive Disinvestment anD ChurChifiCation
What Peck and Theodore (2012: 179) call “the prosaic and frequently 
tawdry practice of [neoliberal] deregulatory statecraft” typically involves 
disinvestment in social protection measures, and the decentralization and 
commodification of formerly state provided services. David Harvey (2015) 
goes even further to claim that neoliberal states have become active agents 
in capitalist “accumulation by dispossession” and under the pretext of 
deregulation seek to create a favorable climate for business interests, pro-
tect the integrity of financial institutions over community interests, and 
redistribute wealth in a way to keep large segments of the population 
impoverished and corporate capitalist greed satisfied(Harvey 2015). In 
this context it is the “overgrown penal state”, which keeps the poor under 
control, and thus neoliberalism “entails not the dismantling but the reen-
gineering of the state” (Wacquant 2012: 6), specifically “market- 
conforming” state crafting. This is a political rather than an economic 
project, in which the state re-regulates the economy, commodifies existing 
services, imposes disciplinary social policy to replace both welfare and 
workfare systems, and uses penal policy and the discourse of individual 
responsibility to keep people in line (ibid.). It is in this context that the 
crisis of care becomes more apparent than ever. The exclusive emphasis on 
profit leads to a devaluation of reproduction, and reduces support for the 
birthing and raising of children, caring for the sick and the elderly, and 
maintaining social ties which hold together families and communities 
(Fraser 2016; Isaksen et al. 2008).
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In good neoliberal fashion, the Hungarian state has also withdrawn 
funds from social protection in the past decade. In 2010, Hungary dedi-
cated 17.4% of its GDP to social protection expenditure, which was 
reduced over the years to 13.3% by 2018, while the EU-27 average 
remained stable at roughly 19% (Eurostat 2019a). Indeed, as Prime 
Minister Orbán pointed out, the aim of the Hungarian government was to 
transform Hungary from a welfare to a workfare state, which meant reduc-
ing need-based provisions to the bare minimum, and securing workplaces 
to those willing and able. Following this logic, the Orbán government 
invested in developing a public works program which soon grew to be one 
of the largest in the world, and, as noted above, cut cash payments of all 
varieties, replacing some with benefits in kind. The length and value of the 
unemployment benefits was decimated, access to long-term sick pay 
became cumbersome and the value of a variety of social provisions to the 
needy was devalued. OECD statistics confirm that the proportion of the 
country’s GDP spent on cash transfers decreased significantly while in- 
kind services have remained stable since 2010 (OECD 2019).
Up to this point, a familiar picture is presented: parts of the world 
exposed to global neoliberal economic policies and the structural adjust-
ment requirements of international financial organizations often follow 
these patterns. In fact, this strategy is not altogether different from what 
several rather liberal Hungarian governments had pursued in years prior to 
Orbán’s accession to power. On closer inspection, however, one impor-
tant distinction emerges. In 2019, Hungary and Germany were recorded 
as the two countries within the EU which spent the largest share of all 
social protection costs, 12%, on a specific function, namely “family protec-
tion”. When the costs of earned income tax credit are added, Hungary is 
one of the world leaders in this regard (Makay 2018). To be clear, family 
protection is euphemism for pronatalist policies offering incentives to het-
erosexual Hungarian families to have more children. So while spending on 
other areas of social protection, such as welfare and unemployment 
declined, “families” have been targeted with generous support. (The quo-
tation mark is a reminder that only one specific form of household is con-
sidered a family: heterosexual couples with children and with some form 
of paid employment.) The government has been funding this specific area 
of reproduction generously. Although this is just one segment of care 
work, it is an important one, and one which demonstrates that instead of 
neoliberal state retrenchment, in Hungary we are witnessing the reorgani-
zation of state capacity in line with specific political goals.
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Critiques of neoliberal governance note with alarm the increase in 
deregulation of state services in western economies. A curious alternative 
has been emerging in Hungary. First, certain state services have in fact 
expanded: the government has been building nursery schools and has 
increased access to state provided childcare. Although a small number of 
private providers are also on the market, their share is insignificant: fewer 
than 10% of children spend time in paid day care (KSH 2019c).
In other areas, the state is in fact deregulating, but favors only a specific 
type of provider: a handful of trusted churches. In this case the goal is not 
to cut costs, as the state funds these services more generously than it does 
its own institutions. Instead, the goal is to build political loyalty for pres-
ent and future generations. Churches have played a growing role in social 
services in Hungary since the collapse of state socialism, but their partici-
pation has increased exponentially in the past decade. By 2020, churches 
ran about 25% of homes for the elderly and the disabled, provided 45% of 
all basic social services, and 60% of all child protection services (Magyar 
Nemzet 2020, quoting the Minister for Social Affairs). Care in these insti-
tutions is not paid for by donations from members of the church commu-
nity. Instead, the Hungarian state allocates resources to a small number of 
established churches to provide the same service as the state or civil orga-
nizations do. Only churches receive more funding per capita than a state 
or non-governmental provider would and they are not obligated to spend 
all of the money on the actual service in question. By a recent decree, the 
largest churches also receive the property rights of the institutions they 
run, cementing their role in the field and allowing them space for indepen-
dent economic activities. The lack of separation of the church and the state 
is especially poignant in primary and secondary education, where religious 
schools have multiplied at the cost of funding good quality secular public 
institutions. In 2001, fewer than 5% of children attended schools run by 
churches. In 2019, 15% of primary school students and 25% of secondary 
school children did so. While in western liberal democracies engaging for- 
profit and non-profit providers allows states to control and cut costs, in 
Hungary state services are not commodified or marketized but church-
ified: increasingly overseen by politically and ideologically loyal religious 
organizations, which preach a specific ideology, and support the suste-
nance and reproduction of an anti-liberal political order.
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Women Do Care Work in “families”
“I would like to make a deal with Hungarian women, Hungarian ladies, 
about the future and their role in it as well as the new opportunities the 
government could offer”, suggested Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in a 
radio address on the national radio channel in April 2018, soon after his 
third election victory. His offer clearly reflects a key principle of the new 
pronatalist policies he was referring to: having children is women’s job, 
women’s decision, they are the ones responsible. Since women are 
expected to do the work of birthing and caring for children, the prime 
minister’s offer addresses women and women alone. The third feature of 
carefare regimes is the unashamedly unequal distribution of care work and 
the emphasis on the household as the location for care.
The literature on the de- and re-familialization of care is extensive 
(Mahon 2002; Morgan and Zippel 2003). Familialism denotes policies, 
which encourage care, especially childcare, to be carried out within the 
family. The opposite of the concept is de-familialization, that is, when 
policies encourage the outsourcing of care and thus open up space for 
women’s successful participation in paid work, the two-earner family 
(Javornik 2014). Tendencies of re-familialization have been observed in 
most post-communist societies and several typologies exist to describe dif-
ferent types of policy packages (Fodor et al. 2002; Haney 2003; Javornik 
2014; Rat and Szikra 2018; Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006; Szelewa and 
Polakowski 2008; Szikra and Szelewa 2010). These studies typically take 
into account two large sets of policies—parental leave and the availability 
of childcare—and show how various combinations offer different options 
for women. Some encourage them to do care work at home, others to 
work for wages and send children to childcare institutions, while yet oth-
ers allow families to choose between these two options. My argument is 
that in Hungary’s carefare regime women are assigned care work and care 
is primarily relegated to the home, and simultaneously, they are expected 
to work for wages full time. The conflict between reproductive work and 
work is solved via women’s increased work burden and exploitation.
Hungary’s recent “family protection” policies aim to increase the num-
ber of births. While most demographers agree that they are unlikely to 
raise the total fertility rate to the point of replacement, the policies could, 
at least temporarily, increase the birth rate in at least some segments of 
society (Spéder et al. 2020). Indeed, following the introduction of the tax 
credit-based benefits, in 2014 the number of births increased in Hungary, 
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and after a drop, picked up again in 2020. Birth rates have grown fastest 
in the poorer regions of the country, while the decline in births continued 
in the capital of Budapest (KSH 2020).
As the number of births per woman increased between 2010 and 2020 
from a low of 1.33 to 1.5 and is likely to grow further, families’ reproduc-
tive burden is also expected to become heavier. And, as time budget sur-
veys indicate, the brunt of this extra work will most likely be shouldered 
by women. In 2010, the year for which the most recent data are available, 
mothers of two children, living with their spouses, spent 96 minutes a day 
on childcare (while their spouses also dedicated 37 minutes to this task). 
But in families with three children, mothers spent an additional 82 min-
utes more a day on childcare, over three hours altogether, while fathers of 
three children only did 15 minutes more than fathers of two. The extra 
care burden of another child is clearly carried by women (Falussy and 
Harcsa 2000)and even if we count the gender difference in the length of 
paid work, mothers had about an hour less free time per day than fathers 
in 2010 (KSH 2012).
Mothers’ burden is likely to increase especially as intensive mothering is 
becoming more popular in Hungary too. In a small survey we conducted 
in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, we found that while all moth-
ers increased their care work during the lockdown months more than 
fathers did, educated urban mothers’ workload grew about four times 
more than the average (Fodor et al. 2020). In general women at all levels 
of education spent more time than fathers helping their children with 
school work and educated women especially seemed to have internalized 
the expectation of intensive mothering and the notion that they were 
responsible for making sure their children were not left behind (Geambasu 
et al. 2021).
More children thus mean more work, and that work will most likely be 
women’s responsibility. While a great deal of propaganda is dedicated to 
encouraging women to have more children, no mention is made of men’s 
role in carrying at least some of the care burden. The Hungarian govern-
ment has made several generous adjustments to parental leave benefits 
which are almost exclusively used by women. However, it did not increase 
the length of paternity leave from five working days, which is significantly 
lower than the EU average of 12.5 days.
Welfare typologies usually consider the division of labor with a nuclear 
family—type household in mind (although see Utrata 2015). In Hungary, 
familialization has traditionally included the mobilization of grandparents 
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for care work as well. Although the proportion of multi-family households 
has declined in Hungary over the past 50 years, still about 23% of women 
and 18% of men over 65 live with their offspring (Monostori and Gresits 
2018). Most grandparents are heavily involved in the care of children: in 
2016, two-thirds of 55–79-year-olds participated in this activity. The 
younger, healthier and more educated they were, the more likely it was 
that they helped out (ibid.): an impressive 80% of college-educated grand-
parents looked after small children in Hungary in 2016. Interestingly, in 
this age group there was little gender difference: grandfathers were almost 
as likely to take care of children as grandmothers (ibid.). Building on this 
tradition of multigenerational care, the government has created financial 
incentives for grandparents to take parental leave instead of their children, 
and is offering special support to those who seek to build multigenera-
tional households and to retain care responsibilities within it. In return, 
the government enshrined in the Constitution of 2011 the obligation that 
children take care of their elderly parents in need. This, obviously, is 
another glaring instance where care is familialized, although not via incen-
tives but legal decrees.
In conclusion, in Hungary’s carefare regime mothers are primarily 
responsible for care work in the home. A very small number of families can 
afford to rely on paid help, although more take advantage of grandpar-
ents’ availability. The government’s pronatalist policies have already 
resulted in the birth of more babies and this is likely to continue. There is 
no public mention of the fact that having more children will surely increase 
women’s care work load.
beyonD “baCk to the kitChen”: Women 
as Wage Workers
The fourth feature to note in Hungary’s carefare regime is the one least 
discussed in the literature: the necessity for women to be engaged in paid 
work in addition to producing additional Hungarians for their families and 
the nation. As I showed above, benefits claimed on the basis of care 
responsibilities are also tied to employment history, either explicitly or 
because they require a level of income which is only achievable by two 
earners. In addition, specific targeted regulations directly encourage wom-
en’s return to work. For example, in 2014 a change in parental allowance 
was introduced, which means that women can now keep receiving the 
 E. FODOR
47
allowance even if they go back to work and, unlike before, they can work 
full time. Employers too have long had some incentives to hire women 
with small children through a reduction in taxes on labor. This distin-
guishes Hungary’s anti-liberal carefare regime from European conserva-
tive welfare arrangements, such as, for example, in Germany or Austria 
(Shire and Nemoto 2020). In this carefare regime the “male breadwin-
ner” model or the notion of the family wage are not ideals to be followed, 
quite the opposite.
In Hungary, women have long been permanent participants in the 
labor market, and their wages have been essential for the family budget. At 
the same time, women are also responsible for care work in the home: they 
drop out of the labor market for lengthy periods after childbirth and dedi-
cate significantly more time than their spouses to the daily chore of raising 
children and doing other types of care work. This necessarily limits their 
opportunities in paid work, puts them in a precarious position in the labor 
market, and occasionally forces them to accept trade-offs between wages 
and the ability to meet their reproductive responsibilities (Mandel and 
Semoyonov 2006; Petit and Hook 2009). Two issues clearly differentiate 
carefare regimes from others which encourage a dual wage earner model. 
First, the stated goal of achieving gender equality in the labor market is 
missing in Hungary as are policies which require that employers, including 
state employers, guarantee transparent and reliable work–life balance mea-
sures. Second and related, instead of equality legislation or workers’ rep-
resentation, women’s work is “sentimentalized”: women are constructed 
in official political discourse as primarily carers, even in the workplace. 
Care work is devalued and, as elsewhere, it is understood as part of wom-
en’s true feminine identity, not as part of their job description (England 
2005; Hochschield 1983).
The combination of these two factors—sentimentalization and the lack 
of gender equality/care work reconciliation measures—result in an 
increase in the “motherhood penalty”, that is, the disadvantages mothers 
suffer at work, and exacerbates workplace gender inequality, especially at 
the bottom of the social hierarchy. It leads to the emergence of an under-
class of women workers, who may have the opportunity to be earning an 
income in humiliatingly underpaid jobs but must struggle on a daily basis 
to hold on to their positions and manage their care responsibilities simul-
taneously (Gregor and Kováts 2018, 2019). I will start with a discussion 
of this latter phenomenon.
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An Underclass of Working Women
Paid work opportunities soared after 2015 as the Hungarian economy, 
partly fueled by payments from the European Union’s structural funds, 
picked up speed in the aftermath of the economic recession. In 2019, the 
unemployment rate stood below 4% and remained under 5% even during 
COVID-ridden 2020. As Fig. 2.1 shows, both men and women were able 
to find work and while in the early 2010s Hungarian women’s labor mar-
ket participation rate counted as one of the lowest within the EU, by 2020 
it had climbed to average levels (Eurostat 2019b).
Two points are important here. First, women’s employment growth 
seems to be slowing after 2012: the gender gap in employment started to 
widen slowly but perceptibly. Indeed, Eurostat data indicates that, com-
pared to men, women in Hungary are less likely to be able to transition 
from unemployment to employment. This is true for most countries but 
the gap in Hungary was five percentage points in 2019 (as well as in sev-
eral prior years), which is twice the EU-27 average, and higher than in 
other CEE countries (Eurostat 2019c). The COVID pandemic further 
increased the difference in the number of employed men and women 
(KSH 2021).
Second, the gender gap in access to paid work is particularly large 
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occupational hierarchy and there are significantly more women than men 
in this group. But the number of employed women in this category has 
been growing. While in 2011 only about 31% of women with elementary 
education were working for wages, this percentage increased to 46% by 
2019—a close to 50% growth, larger in absolute numbers and percentage 
terms than in any other educational groups (ibid.). This is the underclass 
of women workers I mentioned previously. Working for wages is not all 
bad. Employment opened up new, if rather limited, financial opportunities 
for women at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. It, however, also 
exposed them to more gender inequality, more work and harsher 
exploitation.
Women’s wages are lower than men’s in Hungary and women in the 
lower educational category experience roughly the same wage gap as the 
national average of 16% (Eurostat 2019d). Lower wages are less likely to 
help pull someone out of poverty and this is what we see in Fig.  2.2. 
Women’s at-work poverty risk had been lower than men’s until 2015, after 
which it started to exceed men’s. Working women’s risk of poverty dou-
bled from 4.6% in 2010 to 8.7% by 2019 and exceeded men’s which stood 
at 8.1% in 2019 (see Fig. 2.2, based on Eurostat 2019e). In other words, 
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Fig. 2.2 At-work poverty risk by gender. (Source: Eurostat 2019e)
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poverty increased, suggesting that women’s wages are less likely to move 
their and their families’ living conditions above the poverty line than 
men’s. Note that the women who are classified as poor in this chart may 
have been poor before 2016 as well, but they were not included in these 
statistics as they did not have paid employment. In the middle of the 2010s 
they started to join the ranks of underpaid, precarious workers.
This underclass of women is heavily overrepresented among workfare 
workers. In an effort to eliminate what Prime Minister Orbán called a 
“welfare society”, the Hungarian government boosted workfare programs 
to the point where close to 200,000 people participated at the peak in 
2016. Workfare participants get paid a fraction of the minimum wage and 
typically work in menial jobs, which do not enhance their labor market 
chances (Cseres-Gergely and Molnár 2014). Studies suggest that in rural 
areas workfare opportunities are often allocated in exchange for political 
favors (Róna et al. 2020). Yet, workfare arrangements are popular because 
the alternatives are even worse. As noted before, the government has all 
but eliminated other forms of support for those who lost their jobs. And 
workfare has other advantages as well: it is a form of formal employment 
in reasonably regulated, typically single-shift, and occasionally part-time, 
conditions. These are job characteristics which are not easily available to 
low skilled workers. Importantly, given that workfare workers are in the 
formal economy, they also become eligible for tax benefits for children. As 
a result of all these and other labor market related factors, workfare pro-
grams have become feminized in the past years (Fekete 2021).
In summary, more women have been working for wages in the 
Hungarian economy in the late 2010s than at any time since the transition 
from state socialism but job growth was largest at the bottom of the occu-
pational hierarchy, among the unskilled and also among those who work 
in the vastly underpaid government workfare programs. In addition to the 
opportunity to claim child benefits, women also occasionally choose work-
fare jobs over other types of employment because regular employment—
shift work, informal work without contracts, the requirement to do 
unannounced overtime, the lack of control over the timing of the work 
period and the difficulty in finding part-time options—make it hard for 
women to reconcile childcare and paid work duties. In a recent study 
Dorottya Fekete (2021) asked workfare workers with children about their 
motivations. She found that what they appreciated most were the family 
benefits they gained access to, as well as the more family friendly work 
option of the possibility to work part time in single day time shifts.
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The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–2021 further exposed the vulner-
abilities of women’s employment: in Hungary, as in many other countries 
around the world, more women lost their jobs than men. According to 
aggregate data from the Hungarian Statistical Office, between the end of 
2019 and 2020 (the last quarter in each year), the employment rate of 
men aged between 15 and 64 in fact increased by 0.2% (even though the 
actual number of those employed declined somewhat), while women’s 
rate decreased by 0.4%. Job loss was more pronounced among those with 
less education, and among those employed in public works programs. 
However, even among the college-educated population where the num-
ber of the employed in fact continued to grow during the pandemic, men 
did significantly better than women, widening the employment gap within 
this group (KSH 2021). This is most likely explained by the extremely 
unequal division of care work which prevailed in this social stratum (Fodor 
et al. 2020). The “motherhood penalty”, as this phenomenon is called, is 
the topic of the next section.
Inequalities Among All: The Motherhood Penalty
Hungary has the most generous set of parental leave and family benefits 
policies in Europe, yet also the fewest and most stingy work–life balance 
measures. Together with the requirement for mothers to be working for 
wages, this creates obvious inequalities. Indeed, as my calculations based 
on the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC) data show, 
mothers of children under 16 years of age, net of other characteristics—
such as age, work experience, education, number of subordinates, work 
hours, marital status and whether or not they live in a multigenerational 
household—make less money than women without children. Fathers, in 
fact, experience a bonus over non-fathers. This was true in 2010, and the 
coefficient had increased statistically significantly by 2017: the mother-
hood penalty had grown.2
This is not surprising if we consider the dearth of policies aimed at sup-
porting those with care responsibilities in the labor market. Researchers 
often talk about the reduction in labor rights during the Orbán era: strike 
2 The dependent variable was the log of income, individual variables are listed in the text. 
The variable of interest is the interaction between parental status and gender and I ran joint 
models for the two years with interaction terms to make sure that the change was significant. 
More information is available upon request.
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laws have been changed, overtime payment was reregulated to favor 
employers, unions were weakened and so on (Scheiring 2020). Rather less 
discussion has been dedicated to the extremely weak rights workers with 
care responsibilities have (for exceptions, see Gregor and Kováts 2019; 
Juhász 2012). Work hours in Hungary, as in other post-state-socialist soci-
eties, are higher than in most EU member states. Yet an extremely small 
number of people can work part time, only 4% in Hungary, one of the 
lowest rates in the EU. This is partly women’s choice: wages are so low 
that a part-time salary is not enough to maintain a household. At the same 
time, even if they want to, it is difficult for women to negotiate part-time 
options with their employers (Fodor and Glass 2018; Glass and Fodor 
2011). According to data from EIGE, the European Institute for Gender 
Equality, Hungarians are less likely to be able to set their own work hours 
than other EU states, and women, in particular, claim that they have no 
flexibility in this regard. In comparison to citizens of other EU countries 
Hungarians are less able than to adapt their work hours to external needs, 
they are less likely to be able to determine their own work hours and face 
difficulties when they need to take an hour or so off for personal reasons 
during the workday (EIGE 2019).
None of this is surprising as no consistent government incentive exists 
to prompt companies to enact work–life balance policies. Quite the oppo-
site. In 2014, a new regulation was passed, which required that state 
administrators in one of the largest ministries (state department) and its 
local administrative offices work ten hours a day from 7:30 to 17:30. At 
the time, the minister in charge did not mince words when he claimed that 
“Our job has a beginning but it has no end, so this state department is 
unfortunately not a family friendly workplace” (János Lázár’s speech in 
November 2014). The claim was preposterous, not only because of its lack 
of acknowledgment of the care work burden of his mostly female work-
force, but also because Lázár ignored national legislation about compul-
sory work hours. Nevertheless, a ten-hour workday was instituted and was 
in effect for four years before it was rescinded, just as abruptly as it had 
been implemented. Note that this rule came to be applied to several other 
state institutions as well, all offering the type of pink-collar work that is 
typically understood as representing an opportunity for mothers to recon-
cile work and care responsibilities elsewhere. The Hungarian government 
did not exactly show a good example to privately owned companies, which 
clearly demonstrates its lack of dedication, attention and consideration to 
those with care responsibilities.
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Even during the pandemic, a relatively low number of people could 
work from home in Hungary, although more women did than men 
(Eurofound 2020). An OECD survey showed that, in general, Hungarian 
workplaces are not flexible in terms of work location: in 2015 fewer than 
20% of mothers could do their jobs from a home office at least once dur-
ing the year, placing Hungary into the bottom third of this distribution 
within Europe (OECD 2019). This is so even though quantitative and 
qualitative surveys demonstrate that women with care responsibilities 
would very much prefer to have this option available (Gregor and 
Kováts 2018).
Institutional childcare eases some of women’s care burden. Kindergarten 
places for children over three years of age are fairly easily accessible in 
Hungary, with the exception of areas far from larger settlements. This is 
not the case for nurseries; although Orbán’s government has dutifully uti-
lized earmarked EU resources to build more child care institutions. This is 
reflected in a moderate increase in attendance over the past decade. In 
2010, over 90% of children under three years did not attend any formal 
childcare institution, while in 2019 only 83% did not, which is still far 
from the EU average of 35% (Eurostat 2019f). In addition, childcare facil-
ities are rather inflexible in opening hours: most close at 5 pm and there is 
little leeway for extra hours or a different schedule. This constrains par-
ents’, mostly mothers’, work time options.
Even when work–life policies do exist, their implementation is not nec-
essarily automatic: women feel that they are asking for a personal favor. In 
a research project conducted with Christy Glass among professional moth-
ers in Hungary we found that they do not consider part-time options 
(although legally guaranteed for women returning to work with children 
under three years) or parental leave policies (also enshrined in law) as true 
entitlements. Instead, they had to negotiate the terms of their leave, as 
well as their return, and were dependent on the goodwill of their supervi-
sors. As a result, some women managed to get an arrangement that was 
acceptable and allowed them to balance work and family, while those 
whose supervisors were less understanding did not; in some cases this 
resulted in major breaks or shifts in women’s careers (Fodor and Glass 
2018). Personal connections and the importance of social capital are 
deeply embedded in Hungarian social institutions and history, which is 
one of the reasons why the women we interviewed did not find the neces-
sity to negotiate legally mandated rights problematic.
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Instead of Gender Equality Policy: Sentimentalization
Through its anti-gender discourse and conspiracy theories about the EU’s 
gender lobby, the government absolved itself of responsibilities regarding 
women’s equal opportunities in the labor market. The quote at the begin-
ning of the chapter from the Minister of Family Affairs reinforces this. 
Katalin Novak suggests that women should not be seeking equal wages to 
men; they should be content with the opportunity to be “real” women, to 
give birth and to take care of others. She is not alone in her open denial of 
the principle of equality. The President of the Hungarian Parliament 
argued this in 2019:
We should not overemphasize equality as that would mean the abolition of 
genders and in the end the rejection of femininity and women’s virtues. 
(LaszlóKövér, in FICSAK 2019)
In other words, equality would threaten women’s identity as women; 
femininity is essentially the opposite of gender equality. It is in this spirit 
that the Hungarian government has ignored EU-wide gender equality 
action plans, road maps and policy recommendations. A national-level 
round-table involving experts, NGOs and government officials on gender 
issues was discontinued, the section of the ministry which dealt with gen-
der equality closed down, and the government first de-funded and then 
closed the Equal Opportunity Commission which had been designed to 
oversee problems related to gender-based discrimination, despite the fact 
that it is an EU requirement to have an EOC in place. The Hungarian 
Parliament has refused to ratify the Istanbul Convention on the elimina-
tion of violence against women, including domestic violence, and the 
Prime Minister has threatened to veto any EU regulation containing the 
word “gender”, including the Action Plan for Gender Equality III.
I argue that instead of striving toward gender equality, the government 
has started to sentimentalize women’s care work and closely confound it 
with women’s identity as women. To illustrate I analyze quotations from 
a government funded publication in which men wrote laudations to 
women on the occasion of the International Day of Women in 2019. 
These were collected in a booklet and published by an organization called 
the Organization of the Club of Young Families (FICSAK 2019). (More 
on the publication in the methodological section of Chap. 1.)
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Practically each one of the quotes from top-level politicians published 
in the booklet mentions how women excel in care work, both in the home 
and in the workplace. As the Minister for Defense argues: “We think of 
women as the weaker sex, but they represent real spiritual power. They 
represent persistence, selfless dedication and love and all they expect in 
return is respect, attention, appreciation, love and kindness.” Or in the 
words of the Minister of Human Affairs: “You [women] are caring, atten-
tive, empathetic, beautiful. You give birth to children, you are the heart 
and soul of families.” To quote a state secretary in the same ministry, “We 
need women to make our institutions, our communities, our families 
accepting, warm and caring”. In all these cases womanhood is associated 
exclusively with caring and related attributes including kindness, devotion, 
gentleness, understanding and so on, and the production of these feelings 
in various communities is assigned to women and women alone. At the 
extreme, here is an example from a deputy minister who explicitly identi-
fied women’s role as being men’s primary support mechanisms. He wrote, 
“It is women who help hold the World together, and who we, men, can 
rely on day after day in our work, at home, in our communities”.
The quotes associate women with acceptance, warmth, providing care 
and support, and none mention productivity, creativity or intelligence, 
even within these attributes. In the workplace too, women represent the 
very same qualities. “I want to thank my own female colleagues … that 
they always suggest the possibility of a compromise not only in the family 
but in the workplace as well” chimes in a state secretary from the Ministry 
of Finance. Importantly, several men acknowledge the fact that it is hard 
work to be caring for a family and working for wages simultaneously. 
Women are expected to be overworked, and it is considered to be wom-
en’s special skill to tolerate this. As a state secretary put it, “Only you 
[women] are able to do this: be a mother and a wife and at the same time 
do well in your job as well”; or in the words of another high-level male 
politician: “We often forget the many challenges women must face in our 
world today. They have to work for wages and must be perfect wives, 
mothers, problem solvers.” “Nothing compares to women’s performance. 
In addition to their visible—paid work … [they also take care of their fam-
ily]. … This is hard work. It is a calling, rather than a simple job yet they 
do it smiling, without complaint, naturally” (Minister of Finance).
Although the men acknowledge the exceptionally hard work women 
do, note the multiple references to a calling, rather than a form of skill or 
hardship that requires or warrants compensation. “Being a woman is more 
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than a simple task. It is a calling” repeats one of the state secretaries of the 
Parliament. Women are due respect and appreciation but not tangible 
rewards. The politicians here sentimentalize women’s work: they elevate it 
to the level of a calling, where financial incentives and rewards seem mean-
ingless. Let us end this section with the words of Hungary’s young 
Minister of Finance, who seems to be familiar with the term “invisible 
work” and acknowledges that women do most of it, both in the family and 
in the workplace. But “they do this out of the kindness of their hearts 
without expecting remuneration of any form, simply because they con-
sider it the right thing to do”.
In Hungary’s carefare regime, femininity is closely tied to selfless care 
work within and outside the family setting. Men take part at their pleasure, 
but care is women’s primary responsibility. The work is much appreciated, 
it is considered important and socially valuable, but not remunerable. 
Care work is sentimentalized rather than commercialized.
ConClusion
I have argued that a new response is emerging to the crisis of care in 
Hungary. The policy direction I call “carefare” aims to eliminate the con-
tradiction between intensifying production and the need for reproduction 
by piling additional work burden on the shoulders of women and taming 
their possible reluctance by discursively connecting femininity to care work.
As several researchers have pointed out, the role of the state in manag-
ing the economy, society and redistribution is extremely important in anti- 
liberal Hungary (Magyar 2016; Scheiring 2020). From this position, the 
government has made good political use of Hungarians’ long-standing 
anxieties about the disappearance of their bloodline and the death of the 
national culture due, allegedly, to women’s reluctance to reproduce. 
Demographic revival was placed on the agenda of the Orbán government 
immediately upon gaining power in 2010 and it became its true focal 
point after 2015. As a consequence, over the past decade, the Parliament 
has passed a whole slew of policy measures to encourage births, specifically 
to encourage births to heterosexual, married, working families. In the pro-
cess, the state has created a carefare regime: encouraged women to have 
children, and do most of the associated care work, while simultaneously 
constructing them as second-class, female workers on the paid labor mar-
ket. Claims to social citizenship are now most successfully made on the 
basis of parental and work status combined.
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This move toward a carefare regime has a number of consequences that 
are already visible: the most important is the growing underclass of female 
workers who work for extremely low wages in exchange for being able to 
maintain their labor market status while also taking care of their depen-
dents. I also noted the increased work burden that a higher level of repro-
duction—within the context of the unequal distribution of care 
work—means for women.
At the same time, carefare provides political capital to the Orbán 
regime: it functions as a mechanism to lessen the pain of increasing social 
inequalities. Especially among the lower middle classes, women’s extra 
work may buy households out of poverty, or at least allow them a degree 
of upward mobility, even though this may be limited or fragile. Economic 
growth has resulted in a significant increase in class inequalities in Hungary, 
although some resources have trickled down to certain groups of the pop-
ulation, especially to families with children with some attachment to the 
formal labor market. They are some of the government’s most loyal sup-
porters and the voters who brought FIDESZ into power (Róna et  al. 
2020). Their families are doing better financially under the FIDESZ 
regime, thanks, in part, to the wide range of “family protection” measures 
available to them in the form of loans and government grants.
The most positive development has been that the poverty rate of chil-
dren has declined rapidly during the last few years in Hungary. In 2011 
the poverty risk of a family with three children was a shocking 35%, but 
now it stands at 11.4%, one of the lowest in the European Union (Eurostat 
2020). The same pattern is visible among families with fewer children, 
bringing the poverty risk of children down to levels below the EU average 
(ibid.). At the same time, however, the poverty risks of single people, of 
the elderly, especially elderly women, have all skyrocketed: they have been 
left out of the government provided windfall. While the reduction of child 
poverty is laudable, it should be noted that less than half of all households 
have children, fewer than a quarter have two or more children, and an 
increasing number of people are living alone. For them the carefare regime 
has little to offer.
In conclusion, carefare regimes come with political benefits to anti- 
liberal governments. Carefare eases some of the social tension which 
results from a rapid increase in social inequalities, obvious corruption and 
cronyism. By redistributing a sizeable, but still relatively small, amount of 
resources to a select group of “deserving” families, by increasing their 
social mobility chances, even if to a significantly lesser degree than that of 
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families at the top of the social hierarchy, the government buys the loyalty 
of an important constituency. What we must not forget is that this is hap-
pening on the back of women, on the condition of women’s increased 
contribution to care work and compromise in work options.
In addition, upward mobility, even among those most favored by gov-
ernment policy, may be fragile. Over a third of all marriages end in divorce3 
in Hungary and the small steps toward upward mobility may fall away 
quickly as divorcing couples have to share responsibilities for mortgages 
and loans, or when the promised number of children do not arrive, or as 
the job market ebbs and family income dwindles to the point where meet-
ing interest payments becomes problematic. In this context women’s sac-
rifice will be even more starkly visible.
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Abstract This chapter is about foster parents and their work. Recent 
changes in the regulation of foster care illustrate the formation and opera-
tion of a carefare regime: the transformation of state policies and services 
and the integration of foster parents into the “deserving” female working 
and caring underclass. Relying on two years of participant observations 
and interviews with foster parents, experts, guardians, social workers and 
foster parent agency personnel, I describe the highly skilled care work 
most foster parents provide in demanding circumstances for a practically 
endless number of work hours. I explain how their status has been trans-
formed from being volunteers to being contracted employees who work in 
increasingly precarious circumstances for extremely low wages. I argue 
that sentimentalization of care work is used by policy makers to discipline 
foster mothers into accepting the new terms of their relationship and by 
foster parents too to rationalize their compliance.
Keywords Carefare • Foster care • Welfare state • Child protection • 
Gender inequality • Professionalization • Labor control
In Chap. 2, I argued that since 2010 the Hungarian government has cre-
ated a carefare regime, that is, introduced a set of policies, political prac-
tice and discourse which exacerbate the exploitation of women through 
their care work and in the paid labor market. In turn, the government 
utilizes this process to legitimate and maintain an anti-liberal rule.
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This chapter is about foster parents, their work, their skills, their wages 
and work conditions. A recent change in the regulation of fostering pro-
vides a classic example of the emergence of principles of carefare, it is thus 
worth studying the process in depth. Until 2014, most Hungarian foster 
parents worked as volunteers but were then reclassified as gendered care-
fare workers with employment contracts, wages, social security benefits 
and increasingly difficult work conditions. They have become part of the 
predominantly female “deserving” underclass-in-formation that the previ-
ous chapter foreshadowed.
Hungary’s carefare regime did not simply withdraw state funding from 
child protection. Instead the government has “creatively” (Bátory 2016) 
recycled it for future political gain. The meager national child protection 
budget has been put to use in a way that strengthens the political power of 
the regime and feeds its loyalists more than it feeds abandoned children. 
The state budget for child protection and foster care is co-utilized to 
reproduce political power. After a brief look at the history of child protec-
tion in Hungary this chapter describes the turn toward carefare, both 
within the state organization of fostering, and in the everyday world of 
foster parents.
Fostering in Hungary: a Quick Look to tHe Past
Hungarian children grow up reading the story of “Árvácska” [Little 
Orphan] a literary classic of Zsigmond Móricz, which describes the long 
list of abuses suffered by a poor orphan girl at the hands of foster parents 
in the 1930s. Hungary’s first child protection legislation was passed in 
1901, three decades before her story and the new law institutionalized 
state responsibilities for abandoned children (Demény 2015; Herczog 
1998; Mészáros-Tóth 2014; Veczkó 2000). A central state-run orphanage 
was established in Budapest and the state recruited foster parents or 
“tápszülők”, literally “feeding parents”, who received payment for taking 
in children. Over 80% of abandoned children were raised in foster families 
in the first decades of the twentieth century. Life in these foster homes, as 
evidenced by the story of Árvácska, was notorious for its hardships, heavy 
workload and vile treatment. Hungarian orphanages were also vastly 
underfunded, even compared to similar institutions within the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy (Varsa 2020).
After World War II, state socialist policy makers reconceptualized the 
needs of abandoned children altogether: the communist regime wanted to 
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put an immediate end to individual fostering and emphasized its associa-
tion with child labor in politically objectionable “kulak” (rich peasant) 
families in the countryside. As a result and following famous Soviet author 
and pedagogue Makarenko’s ideas described in his widely popular 
Pedagogical Poem, state authorities saw a chance in abandoned children to 
realize their dream of communal upbringing in the service of producing 
the new communist men (later women as well). Replacing foster care, 
children who were removed from their homes for a variety of reasons, 
including material hardship, health and moral abandonment, were sent to 
newly built state- run institutions (Varsa 2020). This new “scientific peda-
gogical” model was understood to be the most modern way to raise chil-
dren, and institutional care was considered politically more trustworthy 
than individual families. In addition, the supply of women at home who 
would have time to devote to raising children dwindled as state socialist 
policies pushed everyone to take on paid work. To meet children’s needs 
so defined, state authorities nationalized several large mansions that had 
belonged to the upper bourgeoisie and turned them into children’s homes. 
This move was to serve a double purpose: to strip upper class Hungarian 
families of their private property, and to demonstrate the regime’s com-
mitment to the most vulnerable. What could serve as better demonstra-
tion of the ideological direction of the new political regime than stories 
about previously starving and disheveled children playing happily in gor-
geous playgrounds and parks of the kind they could never imagine even 
approaching before. To this day, a number of state homes for abandoned 
children can be found in these now decrepit villas surrounded by beautiful 
parks with century- old trees, some in the most sought after locations in 
and around Budapest. As a model solution, in 1957 Hungarian state 
authorities opened “Children’s City” 20 kilometers north of Budapest in 
what used to be a castle of the Károlyi family and its surrounding 140 ha 
park. In its heyday the complex housed some 800 children along with 200 
social workers and teachers and had its own schools, infirmary, lake and 
park with rare and protected trees, movie theater, sport courts and other 
services on its premises. Like many infrastructural establishments, chil-
dren’s newly appropriated homes in the early 1950s may have been con-
sidered “modern” at the time they were built or renovated for use but 
were henceforth vastly underfunded and gradually deteriorated. News of 
abuse and deprivation was silenced and critiques of the conditions in state-
run children’s homes only resurfaced after the 1990s (Varsa 2020). During 
the state socialist era, only about 20% of abandoned children grew up with 
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foster parents (Herczog 1998), a steep decline from the 80% a few decades 
earlier. Children were only placed in individual homes if and when places 
in institutions were not available. (See state regulation 2111/1954 
(VIII. 25) MT.)
However, in the 1980s a slow change started in how the needs of aban-
doned children were understood. By this time it became obvious that the 
political agenda of educating children as model communist citizens had 
failed. Psychological research started to gain prominence in the early 
1970s, and studies showed a high rate of criminal behavior and addictions 
among children who grew up in childcare centers (Demény 2015). The 
more progressive psychologists argued, based on local experience as well 
as increasing contact with Western European experts, that children do 
better if they are raised in families or at least in more intimate settings 
(Veczkó 2000). In addition, the mansions of the 1950s started to crumble 
and their maintenance proved to be an insurmountable cost. As a result, 
attempts started to resurrect elements of the foster care system and larger 
state institutions were broken down into smaller, “family like” units.
The fall of the communist regime in 1989 accelerated the pursuit of 
these ideas already familiar to more progressive groups among child pro-
tection experts. In 1991 Hungary ratified the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and Hungarian experts and social work professionals 
looked to Western European models, primarily in Anglo-Saxon areas, to 
overhaul the Hungarian child protection system (author’s interview with 
Mária Herczog, 2015). After a period of intense debate, a new Child 
Protection Law was passed in 1997 which set the tone for further develop-
ments. Following the lead of the UN Convention and the existing inter-
national wisdom on children’s needs, this legislation strengthened the 
rights of birth families and established a basic framework of social support 
for families in need to prevent the removal of children by providing basic 
services once children were identified as in danger. The new law prohib-
ited taking children away from their birth families for financial reasons, 
and state agencies were tasked to meet the financial needs and basic ser-
vices required by troubled families. Social services were decentralized, 
local providers were to offer services and local agencies determined and 
met needs. This legislation was one of the first of its kind in the Central 
and East European region, and one most similar to existing Western prin-
ciples. Then in 2014 the Orbán government passed a new law which radi-
cally transformed the Hungarian foster care system again; this will be the 
subject of discussion in this chapter. First, in line with EU and UN 
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recommendations, the law stipulated that children below 12 years of age 
should grow up in foster (or, in ideal situations, adoptive) families rather 
than in state institutions. Second, the work of fostering was reclassified 
from a volunteer unpaid activity into the category of a special paid employ-
ment relationship outside of the remit of the Hungarian Labor Code. A 
number of related regulatory mechanisms were further introduced to 
change the working lives of foster parents as well as of the agencies over-
seeing their work.
There are about 20,000 children registered in child protection in 
Hungary in 2020 and 14,000 of them are growing up in approximately 
5500 foster homes. The number of children has been increasing, while the 
number of foster parents remained stable in the decade of the 2010s (KSH 
2019a). Child protection and within that fostering is a small segment of 
the state apparatus but one that vividly demonstrates the real-life function-
ing of a carefare regime. In the next section I describe changes in the role 
of the state in regulating child protection. Then in the following part of 
this chapter I examine how the lives of foster parents have been transformed.
centraLizing and re-engineering state services
Austerity has been one of the guiding principles of all state institutions in 
the past 25  years in Hungary, child welfare being no exception. A key 
reason why the institutional shift in fostering was initiated and successfully 
pursued in 2014 was the fact that it was considered cheaper in the long 
run than financing large state-owned institutions, with their crumbling 
walls and decrepit furniture. In the state socialist era, the villas appropri-
ated for children in the 1950s were barely maintained and now required 
major renovation. Or, alternatively, they offered an opportunity, since 
instead of restoration they could be sold on the prime real estate market. 
Soon enough, even the largest institution, the one described above in the 
city of Fót, was sold to cronies of the government, with children moved to 
smaller institutions and foster care. “The costs of care with foster parents 
is about 1 million HUF per year, while in a children’s home, small or large, 
it amounts to 2.8 to 4 million HUF per year per child” (Author’s inter-
view with a high-level state executive in the Ministry of Human Resources, 
June 2016).1 Others, however, claimed that good quality fostering was 
1 The quotations in this chapter are from interviews conducted during my research on 
fostering. See more information on the methodology in Chap. 1.
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just as expensive as care in state institutions, but this quality was not 
reached in Hungary exactly because of the scarcity of funding available. 
Indeed, all agencies complained about the low level of staffing, where 
those supporting foster parents (advisors, guardians) typically look after 
many more children than is mandated by the state legislation, and where 
funding is not available for each agency to have its own psychologist, even 
though all children removed from their birth homes would need one. To 
explain why she is about to quit her job and look for employment in a dif-
ferent sector, a social worker in a large foster parent network agency told 
me: “I know what each and every family would need to survive, I usually 
know it very well. But those services don’t exist, so I more often than not 
can’t help them. That’s what’s really frustrating” (Marina, foster parent 
advisor, Budapest).
How much did the state spend on child protection after the transfor-
mations in 2014? That is difficult to tell. Unlike neoliberal efficiency- 
oriented work organizations with their audits, benchmarks and indicators 
(Shore 2008), transparent data collection and presentation is not of high 
importance for anti-liberal rulers. In principle, state spending on child 
protection is public information in Hungary. But getting reliable and sys-
tematic data requires a very long wait, personal connections and favors. I 
managed to obtain some, but only some of the required information from 
the Hungarian Treasury for the years of 2010–2017 and a selection of the 
relevant line items is included in Table 3.1.
The data are difficult to interpret because, as experts at the Treasury 
warned me, the rules and principles of data collection regarding child pro-
tection services changed twice during this seven-year period. In 2013, the 
data collection on government spending was revamped and activities were 
reclassified in a way that made comparison with later years impossible 
(hence the gray shades in Table 3.1). In 2014 the child protection system 
was completely transformed based partly on the argument that foster care 
was cheaper than institutional care. Yet at least for the years 2014 and 
2015 it is impossible to separate the amounts spent on fostering and on 
institutional care—they are grouped together as per the regulation of 
2013. The rules changed again in 2016 and spending data are again avail-
able in detail. Whether or not the categories cover the same expenses is 
altogether unclear and information on this was simply not accessible. The 
meaning of a category “Programs supporting the life quality of children 
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the overall child protection budget in 2017, is impossible to penetrate. 
And the classification rules changed again in 2020.
With these caveats in mind, what do we learn about possible changes in 
the amount of state spending on child protection over the years? Shall we 
describe this as a period of grave austerity? To the extent that this is dis-
cernible, given the lack of transparency in the data collection and presenta-
tion, there is no sign of state retrenchment for the child protection sector 
as a whole. Instead, we see fluctuation—possibly due to classification 
changes or to actual cost-cutting—and some overall growth toward the 
end of the period. Between 2010 and 2013 the data show stagnation and 
decline in spending for the first three years then an 8% growth in the 
fourth, in 2013. The overall four-year change is smaller than the cumula-
tive inflation rate over this period, which means that the real value of 
spending stagnated at best, most likely declined. After the first major 
change in the classification system in 2014 note the sizeable fluctuation 
over the years and a sudden increase in 2017. Some of this increase has to 
do with the rising cost of nursery schools, which is also included in this 
rubric, but there seems to be a general tendency toward increased spend-
ing on vulnerable children in every category of the table. There is one 
exception as the third line in the table attests: foster care. While the num-
ber of children in foster care increased by over 25% between 2010 and 
2017, spending on fostering recorded in the central budget remains 
unchanged. This, given the rate of inflation, means a significant, roughly 
30% decline in real value. However, there is another budget line, “state 
support to non-state providers”, which is the source of additional funding 
for some foster care agencies. I explain these below.
Contrary to the deregulation tendencies of neoliberal states, the 
Hungarian government has centralized the management and financial 
control of child protection: in 2012 it wrestled responsibilities and power 
away from county seats and local governments and established a new insti-
tution of the Ministry of Human Resources, which is tasked with the over-
sight of child and family protection services. Yet simultaneously, another 
type of deregulation was initiated. Neoliberal states encourage commodi-
fication with the assumption that market-based distribution and provi-
sions are the most efficient, or at least the cheapest (Wacquant 2012). In 
a process counter to this logic, the Hungarian state has “churchified” child 
protection: it allocated significant resources toward the establishment and 
financing of Church organizations based providers. The penultimate line 
in Table  3.1 demonstrates that funding to such providers almost 
 E. FODOR
73
quadrupled over the seven-year period and has increased further since. 
The impact is clearly noticeable too: in 2010 about 7% of children grew up 
in church- affiliated foster parent networks, but by 2018, almost half, 47% 
of them did (KSH 2019b). Practically all large established churches oper-
ate foster parent agencies in 2020: I counted 17 different church-based 
and 3 civil or international networks in addition to the state’s agency.
It is not merely out of a calling to help the down-trodden that churches 
have so successfully got involved in the business of child protection. 
Hungary’s anti-liberal government pays a quota for each child in the child 
protection system to the state provider, yet pays an additional 70% of this 
amount as extra for each child who belongs to a church-affiliated agency. 
This is the sum in the line “state support for non-state providers” in 
Table 3.1. Ninety-seven percent of the money allocated in this rubric goes 
to religious organizations. The basic head quota must be allocated toward 
the designated service, in this case, child protection or fostering, even if it 
is managed by a church-affiliated provider. But churches do not have to 
give account of how they spend the additional funding: it may or may not 
go toward the care of children. Foster parent network directors, whose 
organizations came to be affiliated with churches as a survival strategy 
after this legislative change, told me that their organization received 
between 10% and 20% less than the full state allocation—this is the amount 
that the church keeps for its own budget of what is technically allocated 
for “child protection services”.
In addition, a legislation was passed in early 2021, which gives church 
organizations running social services, including child protection, property 
rights over the real estate in which they are currently operating. In the first 
round in 2021, 29 real estate properties were passed on to various churches 
by the Hungarian state. This also means that the churches are now eligible 
to apply for and receive funding from the European Union to renovate the 
buildings, some of which have exceptional value. This increases the wealth 
and political role of churches that are hegemonically loyal to the govern-
ment. It also allows the state to channel EU funding to organizations over 
which it has significant control.
As I noted above church organizations use most but not all of the allo-
cated state funding to support their foster parent networks. Their insis-
tence on the religious education of children varies from a tolerance of 
positions to a clearly stated expectation of participation in religious ser-
vices. My field notes from a conversation with social workers in a recently 
church-affiliated agency describe the position of the agency’s leader:
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We switched affiliations in 2012 and since then [the Church] is our main-
tainer. Every week a representative from the Church visits to discuss every-
day issues. Practicing the religion is not compulsory but they did insist that 
children follow their religious practices in the summer camps. At the same 
time, they are not forcing us to change our professional work because of 
their faith. (Director of foster parent network, Budapest, Nov 3, 2016)
Other churches are significantly more demanding. I talked to the 
extremely professional and compassionate manager of a then relatively 
small foster parent agency run by the Catholic Church. She was quite 
insistent on practicing the faith because she considered it a better way 
of living.
It is not compulsory for foster parents to be familiar with the teachings of 
the Catholic Church. We cannot hold them responsible for that … but we 
would like them to be aware. I mean aware of Jesus’ mission, the basic values 
of the Church, we teach those. This is not proselytizing … we obviously 
don’t do that. But there is a softer version of evangelization, for example, 
that we celebrate religious holidays and include the children and the foster 
parents and we celebrate together. Or we have these obligatory foster parent 
trainings. The next one will be taught by [a well known Catholic priest], so 
there is certainly an influence, not forceful, but it is important to pass on our 
values. (Head of foster parent agency, Budapest, 2016)
The Protestant Church’s foster parent network is based not only on 
faith but requires belonging to, or at least being familiar with, local church 
organizations. The head of the agency explained:
You can only become a foster parent if you have a recommendation letter 
from your local minister. This is a guarantee that the person is not doing it 
for the money. And it is important for the children to join the church com-
munity, because those who belong there are more likely to lead a Christian 
life, a solid, stable, organized, harmonious life. (Head of foster parent 
agency, 2017)
The principle of the separation of the state and church is clearly not of 
high importance here. The political gains are obvious. First, FIDESZ gov-
erns in coalition with the remnants of the Hungarian Christian Democratic 
Party, and even though the latter has little independence in most matters 
political, they tend to contribute to the discourse on family, children, 
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gender, morality and so on. Also, surveys have shown that the governing 
parties are significantly more popular among those who claim that they are 
religious, so measures promoting religious organizations is a form of 
catering to the demands of the electorate, indeed, creating these demands 
in the hope of reaping electoral benefits later (Policy Solutions 2015). In 
addition, media accounts describe numerous instances when “recommen-
dations” on voting were shared from pulpits before elections—making the 
support of churches an eminently sensible political investment.
In summary, it is difficult to interpret data on the volume of state fund-
ing for child protection. It is clear that we cannot talk about major cuts in 
funding, but neither is there any sign of additional support from a suppos-
edly family friendly state to a growing number of needy children and those 
who take care of them. What is absolutely clear, however, is that in recent 
years a significant chunk of child protection services along with their fund-
ing have been outsourced to loyal church organizations. The everyday 
control of these institutions is variable but the potential for comprehensive 
oversight is there. The churches receive additional funding and bonus real 
estate from the state to encourage their participation. Then they can use 
the opportunity to expand their networks, their follower base and evange-
lize, if desired. The state, on the other hand, spends additional taxpayer 
money on offering religion-bound services and buying political loyalty 
from and via church organizations.
careFare: tHe Work oF Fostering
Along with this faith-oriented re-engineering of state functions, the posi-
tion of foster parents vis-à vis said state has also changed. Before 2014 
with the exception of a handful who qualified as paid social workers, the 
vast majority of foster parents worked as volunteers and provided a service 
to the state out of kindness and dedication. This changed abruptly when a 
new piece of legislation eliminated the volunteer foster parent category 
and transformed foster parent contracts into paid employment relation-
ships. As of January 2014, foster parents have become “professionals”. 
They are working for wages at a designated foster parent agency, receive a 
set salary and occasional bonuses as well as social security coverage, includ-
ing old age pension benefits.
This may sound like a turn for the better for the kind volunteers. But 
below I argue that using the pretext of “professionalization”, foster par-
ents have in fact been hired to work on the principle of carefare: they have 
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become part of the working female underclass. Relying on two years of 
participant observations and about 80 interviews with foster parents, 
experts, guardians, social workers and foster parent agency personnel, this 
chapter will demonstrate that foster parents provide highly skilled care 
work in extremely demanding circumstances for a practically endless num-
ber of work hours, often for wages amounting to less than the national 
minimum. Having been classified as “workers” means an increase in con-
trol and surveillance on the part of their employers, less independence and 
more supervision for the foster parents themselves. This process of inte-
gration into carefare was described as “professionalization”.
Professionalization
In the Parliamentary debate on the legislative changes involving the status 
of foster parents, Mrs. Ronaszeki, who introduced the bill and was an MP 
for the government and member of the Committee on Youth, Social, 
Family, and Housing Affairs, pointed out that “It [was] important for 
foster parents to turn their relationship to the state into one of employ-
ment in order to ‘professionalize’ the activity and increase its social pres-
tige” (Mrs Ronaszeki, 2013 in the Hungarian Parliament).
She was not alone. Child protection experts had long argued that the 
social context of fostering had changed and required more skills, expertise 
and energy on the part of the carers.
The children are more vulnerable, it used to be much easier. We don’t do 
well at the early stages of the [child protection] process, when they are reg-
istered in the system, there’s not enough help. So the children arrive in the 
system really worn out … even 3–4 year old kids need therapy. (Foster par-
ent advisor at a Budapest agency)
In sociological parlance, professionalization is the process of creating 
distinctions amongst those who belong to a specific occupational group 
and those who do not, between “professionals” and “amateurs”. Since the 
Middle Ages occupational groups have been fighting to establish them-
selves as professions, a position, which typically brings distinct privileges, 
such as higher earnings, the possibility to claim monopoly over access to 
clients, as well as respectability and status (MacDonald 1995; Wilensky 
1964). The establishment of a profession is often a contentious process as 
was, for example, the case for midwives (Bourgeault 2006), or librarians 
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(Abbott 1988). What makes a professional is widely contested: some 
acknowledge their expert knowledge, established practice of the trade and 
self-regulating professional associations (Parsons 1968), while others refer 
to their position in the social hierarchy which allows them to exclude oth-
ers and construct themselves as members of an exclusive, elite group 
(Abbott 1988; Larson 2012).
An altogether different process of professionalization has taken place in 
the case of Hungarian foster parents: it has been initiated and enforced by 
the state. Foster parents did not claim to be professionals, quite the oppo-
site, many of them actively resisted the term. Yet state policies, new legal 
regulations and institutions have decided to construct them as such, and 
they have allocated some dubious distinctions while simultaneously impos-
ing a new set of expectations and obligations. Historically, there have been 
other instances of professionalization that involved more than just grass-
roots actors. McClelland (1991), for example, describes “professionaliza-
tion from above” in nineteenth-century Germany, where the state had an 
important role in the regulation of entry into professions, such as medi-
cine and law, even engineering and chemistry, as distinct from what he 
calls the more autonomous “professionalization from within” process of 
the Anglo-Saxon model. Our current case of the professionalization of the 
child protection system in Hungary is an extreme version of professional-
ization from above, where those proclaimed to be professionals had little 
input into a process shaped instead by politicians, policy makers, as well as 
local and international experts.
Professionalization targets foster parents who are expected to transform 
themselves from warm-hearted women raising children in need, to profes-
sional paid carers with expertise and lengthy training. They must adjust 
their work schedules to satisfy these criteria, enroll in specialized training 
programs and write lengthy dissertations and reconfigure the way they 
raise children to fit the principles of childcare considered suitable for the 
“modern” world by experts on child development. They must also meet 
new institutional expectations as professional carers and subject them-
selves to even more supervision and surveillance than before, while simul-
taneously losing further degrees of control over their work process to the 
requirements of professionalized processes.
In administrative terms, foster parents must enter a formal employment 
relationship with a network agency; for better or worse they become part 
of the formal labor market. In fact, professionalization from above can be 
understood as a new form of labor control exercised by various state 
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authorities over foster parents who are employees working in a context 
where typical methods of supervision are not easily applicable. Researchers 
have described different mechanisms of increased supervision and coer-
cion, such as scripting or digital automation (Wharton et al. 2008), emerg-
ing in the post-Fordist economy. But there are limits to the possibility of 
despotic control in a setting where clients and customers also feature in 
and complicate the labor process (Leidner 1993; Sallaz 2015; Sherman 
2007). In such contexts other mechanisms such as “permanent pedagogy” 
(Sallaz 2015) or “relational work” (Mears 2015) function as substitutes. 
How to regulate the work of people who do it in their own homes, how-
ever? Fournier (1999: 281) argues that flexible work practices create a 
“discretionary gap” which “needs to be regulated through new softwares 
of control. Professionalism is one of the strategies deployed to control the 
increasing margin of indeterminacy or flexibility in work.”
Professionalization from above is thus not a politically innocent strat-
egy. “It is through their ‘professionalization’, through their inscription 
into systems of expert knowledge, that individuals become targets of lib-
eral government” (Fournier 1999: 284; also Burchell et al. 2014) as well 
as targets of anti-liberal government, we must add. Professionalization 
from above, I argue, is the way in which foster parents get more tightly 
integrated into the lowest rungs of the carefare regime, often against their 
explicit will, occasionally with their informed, or uninformed consent.
Beyond Parenting
It is easy to assume that fostering is nothing but the kind of regular parent-
ing that millions of people do, most of them in addition to their paid jobs. 
But a closer look at the daily activities of an even mildly conscientious 
foster parent quickly proves this statement wrong. As one foster parent, a 
mother of three biological children, succinctly put it: “You’d think you 
know what you’re doing until you get a foster child. Then really basic 
issues come up that you had never encountered before, stuff you’d never 
even dreamt of” (Ibolya, birth parent of three, adoptive parent of one, 
foster parent of two). Foster parenting is extremely taxing work. For one, 
it requires being on call 24 hours of the day on every day of the week and 
it opens up one’s home to ongoing scrutiny from others. More impor-
tantly, fostering requires a number of special skills. Below I describe three 
sets of these relying on the accounts of the practitioners themselves: (1) a 
working understanding of child psychology and the management of 
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emotions—their own and those of others, (2) advocacy skills to be exer-
cised in adverse conditions, and (3) an exceptional level of understanding 
and daily practice of logistics and administration. We all need and rely on 
these skills in our everyday lives. But the stories below demonstrate 
Ibolya’s claim: none of us are expected to use these with the intensity and 
within the specific conditions that foster parents do.
Child Psychology and Emotional Work
Children arrive in foster homes from a variety of domestic or institutional 
circumstances and in varied mental and physical conditions, and the 
encounter is rarely simple. The child is typically traumatized not only from 
her past experiences but also from having been removed from her previous 
surroundings, landing in a rather different setting often all alone, and hav-
ing to adjust to yet another set of rules and constraints. The foster parent 
and her family, much as they may be expecting the child, have to make 
adjustments and many recognize the process as difficult. The first task of 
the foster parent is to help the child adjust to his or her new circumstances, 
which in the case of deeply traumatized children is not a simple task. 
Edina, a foster parent with a great deal of practice described the arrival of 
her three-year-old daughter:
She had a rather hectic background at birth, poor baby, and we were up all 
night for, I am not exaggerating, at least 6 months. She screamed through 
the night, no matter what we did. It was horrible. That was the worst. 
(Edina, three foster children)
Foster Parent Network Agencies do not exactly expect parents to treat 
children with psychological needs, “merely” to handle them with tact, 
kindness and understanding. They should be able to recognize problems, 
seek help and then follow the treatment suggested by the experts. But the 
hands-on support the agencies can afford to provide is rather limited. 
Even the largest foster parent agencies have a single in-house psychologist 
in their employment and some do not have any at all. Even when there is 
a psychologist working for the agency, they have a variety of tasks related 
to institutional needs. They must, for example, participate in the evalua-
tion and screening of foster parent applicants. Their time to work with 
children and their carers is thus limited. One psychologist who had spent 
several years at one of the large agencies told me that her job required total 
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devotion, daily traveling of several hundred kilometers as well as endless 
work hours. “You can only do this if you are a saint and I am no saint”, she 
said explaining why she quit the job she loved after a few years.
Given the limitation in resources available through formal channels, 
foster parents often use their own practical experience and knowhow to 
deal with at least the easier problems, and these are numerous. The exam-
ple below comes from a very experienced, loving foster parent:
They [her two fostered children, who are siblings] are different in many 
ways. … But they both come with a big baggage. Viki, for example, has a 
number of unexplainable fears of things. And bedwetting. Tomi was six 
years old when he got out of diapers and Viki is well past six yet she wets her 
bed nightly so I put a diaper on her to sleep. (Eszter, Pest county, foster 
parent of two)
I heard countless accounts of acts of destruction from spreading feces 
on the wall with regularity to throwing heavy objects at television sets. 
The foster parent is expected to calm the child, quietly clean up and try to 
deal with the cause of the problem. No damages can be claimed and this 
behavior is not considered out of the ordinary or as needing external 
support.
Older children express their anxieties in different ways and foster par-
ents must work not only with their own families but also with their broader 
environment to make adjustments. This can be especially difficult in 
smaller settlements where families know each other. This was the case of 
one foster parent who lives in a village some 60 kilometers east of Budapest 
when his foster children, a pair of siblings, arrived about five years ago. He 
is still embarrassed about being the “talk of the town” even though the 
problem was in fact resolved.
At the beginning Dani [his fostered son] stole other kids’ snacks and this 
came up at a meeting of parents at school. I told them [about the back-
ground of the child]. So the parents then understood and I am sure, well, I 
hope that they explained it to their own children and then this stopped. 
(Gabor, fostering two school age children and parenting biological twins 
who attend the same school a few years ahead of the fostered siblings)
This foster parent had to find the right way to discuss the issue within 
the community, make sure the child and his own family are not excluded 
from the village for their unruly behavior and negotiate the child’s needs 
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which resulted in his stealing snacks. He only had perfunctory help from 
the foster parent agency to tackle the problem and mostly had to rely on 
his own skills as a negotiator, mediator and child psychologist. Another 
foster parent describes the way she “tamed” her son, Alex, who came with 
serious mental and psychological difficulties.
I have managed to get him to the point where he doesn’t bite or kick, where 
tools and other objects are not flying around … so you see, this is a first step. 
Now he only screams. Which is better than when he threw half a brick at me. 
(Nikolett, foster mom to 2 children, with a great deal of fostering experience)
Alex’s rage was successfully controlled by this foster parent without the 
help of an expert psychologist. She relied on her research online, the 
advice of her social worker, as well as her experience with previous chil-
dren, to get to the point where the child was no longer destructive, a feat 
previous carers in institutions or private homes had not been able to 
accomplish.
Some people foster children with known disabilities, for example, Edit, 
who decided to do this work for the purpose of helping sick children. Both 
of her fostered toddlers have Down syndrome yet she received no training 
in how to raise children with Down.
I looked it up at the Down Foundation in Budapest. The first step was that 
we went to a clinic for children with Down syndrome. That’s in Budapest. 
There they told me in detail what medical tests need to be done. No one had 
explained that to me within the [foster parent network] agency. If I had had 
to wait for them, we still wouldn’t have gotten anything done. Because I 
think they themselves don’t know what this [raising children with severe 
Down syndrome] really means. (Edit, fostering two children, in a small 
town in Pest county, about 80 kilometers from Budapest)
Her case may be one of the extremes, but for all, ongoing attention, 
tolerance and intense emotional and physical work are required. A small 
fraction of foster parents can afford to pay for psychologists out of their 
own pockets, others may lobby networks to help them cover the extra 
costs. Many said that they read books on childrearing and popular psy-
chology, and browse internet websites in search of possible solutions to 
behavioral/psychological problems. They may also consult with the social 
worker in their children’s school as well as with the agency’s foster parent 
advisor, who visits regularly and advises foster parents on all issues related 
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to caring for their wards. They participate in supervision and small group 
training workshops in at least some of the foster network agencies and 
discuss problems with other foster parents. Altogether, foster parents 
accrue a great deal of practical knowledge in child development and psy-
chology and are expected to utilize these skills in their everyday work of 
raising children, who typically have grave social and psychological disad-
vantages which must be tolerated, handled and in the best scenario, treated 
successfully.
Never is the need for skillful emotional work more acute or evident 
than before, during and after the regular visitation meetings between birth 
parents and their children. These visits are required by law and happen at 
regular intervals, typically bi-monthly, or monthly as per the agreement 
between the courts and the birth family. In Hungary the management of 
these visits is the responsibility of the foster parent, although about half of 
the time the actual encounter happens in a location designated by the 
agency with some professional personnel and supervision present.
Some birth parents only show up irregularly and sometimes skip visita-
tions without advance notice. This makes for wasted trips and even worse, 
bitterly disappointed children. One foster parent talked about how he 
took his children outside so they can yell their feelings into the air—a 
technique she gleaned from a book on child psychology. Foster parents 
often develop elaborate strategies to avoid these disappointments, from 
not telling the child in advance about the meeting, to planning fun events 
to be done near the meeting place in case the birth parents do not show up.
One time we set off with the two kids [for Budapest to meet birth parents] 
and when we were [entering Budapest] they called to say they couldn’t 
make it because they got sick. So imagine this child, who had carefully pre-
pared a drawing [for her birth mom], who hadn’t seen her parents in 6 
weeks or so and then we finally leave and we are almost in Budapest. At 
every village she asked “is this Budapest already?” And then they tell us not 
to bother going. We turned back and we simply couldn’t comfort Barbie, 
the older child. It was really hard on her. That and the next few days, those 
are always hard. The kids somehow can sense it that the four weeks are up, 
even though we try not to talk about [the upcoming meeting with the birth 
parents], just in case [it gets cancelled].They can sense that it’s time for the 
meeting and they behave accordingly. (Gabor, foster parent of two, who 
takes the children for visits once a month and lives in a small village about 
40 kilometers from Budapest)
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When the meeting does happen, the adjustment back to the reality of 
life in the foster home must be managed carefully. Birth parents may, 
sometimes in the best of faith, sometimes out of negligence, make prom-
ises they cannot keep, and this leads to confusion, anger and anxiety that 
foster parents must somehow manage.
You see, the birth father takes out this child. When they meet, he promises 
the skies to her and then he disappears for two months. So we try to digest 
this. Of course then I know why the kid is going crazy, why she is throwing 
things around or why she bites her classmates so badly that they bleed. 
(Kata, foster mother to four, Budapest)
Other times children may have memories of trauma in their birth homes 
and find the meetings stressful. The quote below describes this, probably 
coupled with the foster parent’s animosity toward and fear of the birth 
parents because of their alcoholism, unruly behavior and anger toward her 
and the Foster Parent Agency. Even if the latter is taken into account it is 
a good example of the psychological stress produced by and to be man-
aged at meetings (or missed meetings) with birth parents. Says Viktoria, 
foster mother of a baby:
This child, Csilla, whom I fostered, she was terrified of her parents. Imagine 
an eight-month-old child desperately hanging on to my clothes when she 
saw her parents. It took 2–3 days after each visit for her to calm down. When 
the parents were forbidden to see her for a few months she became so happy 
and relaxed just because she didn’t have to meet with them. And no matter 
what I tell a psychologist, they can’t do anything about it. There is a serious 
problem here with the legal regulation. (Viktoria, currently fostering 
one child)
The legislation she refers to is the Child Protection Law which gives 
birth parents extensive rights over their birth children, which foster par-
ents often see as unwarranted and undeserved. Indeed, most birth parents 
are not especially well equipped to spend two meaningful hours with their 
children whom they had not seen for at least two weeks. The situation in 
which the meeting takes place does not help matters either. The visitations 
are typically arranged in a large room of the foster network agency, where 
several other foster-birth family couples are also present. Sometimes the 
encounter is monitored by the foster parent herself and one or more 
supervisors of the foster agency. These are tumultuous affairs. I spent 
3 FOSTERING IN A CAREFARE REGIME 
84
several months helping out at visitation hours at two different Foster 
Parent Network Agencies, observing and occasionally helping with these 
rather awkward get-togethers. Parents arrived, unpacked soft drinks and 
sweets, had snacks with the children but then had trouble expressing their 
love and devotion to their child in this heavily supervised context and in 
the way it was expected of them. The meeting rooms are packed with toys, 
so children could run amok, but birth parents rarely had the skills, the 
patience or the mood to play along or to simply engage with children, 
apart from watching and embracing them and feeding them snacks.
There is no parent–child relationship between them. She’d say, come here 
and then embraces him but that’s all, nothing more. She hands him her 
phone and tells him to go ahead and play. So these visits are not exactly 
meaningful in that way. (Mrs Csicso, long-time foster parent, currently of 
three children)
Truly excellent foster parents take it upon themselves to manage the situ-
ation in a way that it becomes comfortable for everyone. This is difficult 
because birth parents’ needs must be taken into account as well, as well as 
the limitations in their ability or desire to parent. Here is how one foster 
parent of many years described what her role is during the visitations.
When Moni and her parents don’t know what to do with each other I try to 
ease the situation because it’s so embarrassing to just sit there and look at 
each other. And of course Moni would come to me as she does on every 
other day of the week. And then I would tell her, come on, let’s show 
Mummy what has happened. And I tell the mother what happened to Moni 
that week but I try to get her involved and get her to say something and Laci 
[her younger child] too, so he would say something as well about what hap-
pened. And I ask the parents about their lives because of course they also 
have lots of problems. (Erika, foster mom of two in Budapest)
This is the exception, rather than the rule, as cultural, class and ethnic 
differences—not to mention the built-in animosity on the part of the birth 
parent toward the Agency and its representatives for interfering in their 
lives—often make even simple communication between birth and foster 
parents difficult. Many foster parents had no patience for dealing with 
birth parents whom they often blamed—directly or indirectly—for the 
problems the children faced. But the most successful ones took on the task 
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of bridging the class/ethnic gap and specifically “teaching” birth parents 
how to parent. This required a great deal of personal dedication and skill.
Szandi’s mom comes the second Saturday of every month and then we try 
to do something together. Because she [the mother] is a pretty neglected 
person, we take her to the Zoo as well, or to swim in lake Velence or Balaton. 
We kind of adopted her as part of the family and on that day she is also our 
child. So we go together. (Andrea, foster mother of two children)
Exercising Professional Technologies of Self
Professional foster parents are expected to relate to their children in a pro-
fessional manner and exercise what is called “smart love” in their work 
activities. Broadly speaking this means loving the child without a sense of 
ownership and full commitment. Foster parents are taught to love their 
children but love them with reservations; to handle them as members of 
the family yet view them as temporary additions, and as people whose 
ultimate fate is not in their hands. Most experts agree that this is a tall 
order: “Foster parents must have a split personality: they are expected to 
tell the children that they belong there, they are members of their family, 
yet must also encourage them to return to their own birth parents” (Foster 
parent advisor, explaining why he could never do this job). Indeed, this is 
a difficult balance and most foster parents are somewhat unsure about 
what “smart love” means or whether or not they should strive to provide 
it. The best explanation I heard highlights the vast amount of emotional 
work that goes into “smart love”, well beyond a simple love for children.
Well, you have to do everything the same as with your own child. That kid 
needs lots of love in their first three years, so they can be self-confident later. 
You must love them the same, only you have to be strong when it is time to 
let them go. Because it is a lot worse for them if they see that I am reluctant 
to let them go, then he will feel guilty. (Bori, an experienced foster parent, 
who has raised a number of very small children who were later adopted, as 
well as a few who grew up in her household.)
Indeed, “losing” a child to adoption or return to their birth families is 
often rather traumatic to foster parents many of whom grow to genuinely 
love their children. This requires so much emotional work that some 
agencies offer psychological counseling on the otherwise rare occasion 
when a child leaves.
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Knowledge of child psychology, complicated emotional work and toler-
ance of psychological distress are all practiced by good foster parents on a 
daily basis. While the work itself is often acknowledged by agency person-
nel, the skills that go into managing the foster child–foster parent–birth 
parent triad is rarely noted (for an exception see Demény 2015).
Advocacy Within Boundaries
While foster agencies do not expect foster parents to be able to solve all 
the child’s psychological and learning problems, they do expect them to 
advocate for the child in various contexts. This is harder than expected 
because foster children are often surrounded by discrimination and dis-
trust, both because of their status as protected children and because many 
of them belong to Hungary’s largest minority, the Roma. Hungarians in 
general express a great deal of animosity toward minorities of all stripes. 
Anti-Roma sentiments are especially strong and have increased over the 
past decade. In recent surveys 73% of the population said that they would 
not consent to a member of the Roma minority moving into their neigh-
borhood, and news and academic reports describe increasing violence 
against the Roma (FXB 2014). Terms, such as “Roma criminality” abound 
in the media and the supposedly problematic “lifestyle” of Roma groups is 
routinely pathologized by Hungarian politicians. In this context, advocat-
ing or simply standing up for the rights of Roma foster children requires 
exceptional courage and determination. Advocacy is especially hard as fos-
ter parents have limited rights over the child: the final decision maker is 
the child’s guardian. In addition, foster mothers—who have typically 
graduated from a technical high school with a certificate in a specific 
trade—have significantly less cultural capital than the teachers and doctors 
they must negotiate with.
It is no surprise then that the ability to advocate for their child was one 
of the key requirements listed by agencies when recruiting foster parents. 
In fact, this is one task agencies typically claim is “work”-like. As Sára, a 
foster parent advisor told me:
For this [foster] child to be able to persuade people that she is valuable, not 
a waste, she must be at least beautiful. But if she is naughty, and ugly and 
god forbid, Roma and maybe even steals occasionally, poor thing, then the 
parents in the school will collect signatures against her … so the [foster par-
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ent] will have to lobby hard for her … she will have to represent the child’s 
interests. (Sára, foster parent advisor, large network in Budapest)
At the same time foster parents must act with a great degree of deco-
rum and be careful to behave in a manner considered “civilized” by the 
mostly middle-class and middle-aged experts of the foster agency. They 
are expected to represent the child, but true “tiger moms” are frowned 
upon too. Ildiko, a middle-aged seamstress in a rural town fostering a 
small boy who was mistreated in kindergarten was told off by her advisor 
when she made a scene at the childcare center.
Then [the foster parent advisor] told me on the phone that I was too loud 
and I didn’t behave appropriately and this behavior is not suitable for a fos-
ter parent. So I said, yes? I would have been curious to see what you would 
have done if they had treated your child like this, what would you have 
done? Of course foster parents must stand up for their children, how could 
I not? Stop kidding me, should I just laugh when they mistreat him? Come 
on … I said that was out of the question, don’t even say such things to me. 
(Ildiko, foster mom of one, her two biological children have already 
left home)
Worse than frowned upon, in fact, this woman was threatened with the 
removal of her child when she raised hell for what she perceived as unfair 
treatment bordering on violence. Foster parents are expected to represent 
the child’s interest vehemently, but within what is a typically moving tar-
get of “professional boundaries”, something that is not necessarily part of 
the vocabulary of lower middle-class blue—or white-collar families. Here’s 
another example from a woman who talks about the same problem though 
formulated in different terms:
You as a foster parent cannot act as a “tiger mom”. Because in the end I have 
no rights at all, all I can do is shut up and raise the child. If I don’t do some-
thing perfectly, the child may get taken away, in fact even my own kids may 
be taken. (Viktoria, foster mother of infants, birth mother of two, living in 
a rural town)
The foster parent above may be expressing more anxiety than is prob-
ably warranted, but her point is on target: foster parents must navigate 
between the Scylla of middle-class civility and the Charybdis of vehement 
advocacy in difficult situations. This requires an understanding of how 
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institutions work, refined interpersonal skills, self-control and 
perseverance.
Dealing with authorities when children have health problems or run-ins 
with the police are similarly difficult. Says Erika, who raises six children in 
a small rural town and teaches religion in kindergartens part-time:
[There was a period of time in the life of her fostered daughter when] I 
spent more of the nights at the police station than in my own bed. But what 
really broke the camel’s back was when she started using drugs. So I told her 
to stop, everyone else did too, the whole foster parent network came to 
talk to her.
Erika was barely equipped to deal with police issues, not to mention 
problems related to drugs and alcohol use. She had received no training 
which may have taught her how to manage these issues. Neither did she 
get sufficient help from her advisor and agency, even though she had 
alerted them to the problem. They came to talk to the child, but in the 
end it was always Erika who had to bail her out from difficult situations.
Anita fosters a girl who just turned six when I talked to her, but she had 
started noticing problems when she had enrolled her in kindergarten there 
years earlier. She spent about 20 minutes of the interview describing her 
trials and tribulations during the process of getting the child some help, of 
which this is a short excerpt:
So I took her to lots of doctors. I told this local doctor that something was 
wrong. He saw that too so sent us to all sorts of places, from the Child 
Development Service to speech therapy, I took her everywhere. [She needed 
permission for each expert visit, as well as financial support from the agency. 
Neither of these could be attained without lengthy petitions, numerous 
phone calls, explanations and occasional surprise visits to the relevant offi-
cial’s office.] In the end, she received some developmental training and 
speech therapy, we did this for 2–3 years … we went to a whole list of ther-
apy classes. (Anita, foster mother of 2)
While birth parents often have to go through the same process, the 
incidence of developmental lags is much higher in the case of fostered 
children. In addition, foster parents must ask for permission from the 
child’s guardian and the foster parent agency for every move they make, 
they must rely on guardians to manage the paperwork, which often takes 
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months, and they face discrimination at every step of the way from author-
ities, including schools and health care providers.
Foster parents must thus advocate for children in a society where dis-
crimination against the Roma and indeed against children growing up in 
untraditional families of any sort are rampant and where their own rela-
tionship to the child must be negotiated among the different actors, 
including the child, in an ongoing manner. This is a skill acquired through 
the process of fostering and is developed in everyday practice. Foster par-
ents themselves talk about learning the ropes through their own mistakes 
and doing better on subsequent occasions. Yet, neither the skills, the effort 
nor the hours are acknowledged when fostering is categorized as an 
unskilled job and when its wages are set.
Managing a Foster Family
Managing a family requires a great deal of invisible work: women’s mental 
load has been described at length in both academic literature and the 
media (Daminger 2019). However, managing a foster family is an enter-
prise on an altogether different scale. Let us review some of the adminis-
trative and management duties unfamiliar to most of us.
In addition to their own wages, foster parents receive an allowance to 
cover the living expenses of their child. The full sum must be devoted to 
the needs of the child and, in many although not in all agencies, the money 
must be placed in a separate account. Whether or not foster parents must 
collect receipts of everyday or only larger purchases for their wards (such 
as clothes or books or food) varies. In some agencies, this is the norm, and 
receipts are checked randomly. At other agencies, only certain items must 
be accounted for.
Oh and the clothes money. We have a certain sum we must spend on clothes 
each year. We are very lucky in this regard because we don’t need a separate 
bank account and simple receipts will do. So I have a separate folder where 
I keep the receipts [for each child] from clothing purchases. (Erzsébet, cur-
rently fostering four children)
All foster children receive pocket money, which needs to be accounted 
for. In fact, each child starting at the age of three must sign a form each 
month to acknowledge that they have been given this amount. The foster 
parent advisor, during her bi-weekly or monthly visit, regularly asks 
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children what they do with their pocket money as a way to check on 
whether or not they have received it. Foster parents, as a result, develop a 
variety of techniques to make sure the child understands that his or her 
money is spent on the toy or food item he chooses and they try to imprint 
this on the child’s memory.
During my interviews at a foster parent agency, I was shown the dossier 
of a foster parent, which contained a long list of days with signatures. This 
was required because two of the children raised in this family studied at a 
live-in high school in a different town. This meant that the foster parents 
only got a part of their salary, proportionate to the actual time the child 
spent in their homes rather than in the dorm. These days had to be docu-
mented on a separate sheet, every month, and filed with the foster agency.
Finally, foster parents must keep a diary of the life of their foster child 
in view of the fact that they may be able to go back to their birth homes 
or may get adopted.
Here’s the diary, let me show you. It is about the children, exactly because 
they are here temporarily—so to say. If they move on to anywhere, are 
adopted or able to move back to their birth parents, I must be able to show 
what happened to the children while they lived with me, how did he get to 
where he is now. This is his life … it is part of our contract, one of our tasks, 
to have this life history diary. We must do it. Now, we can decide how we do 
it. This one (she is showing me the book) I wrote in this every day at first, 
later only once a month. And then he made drawings. This was written to 
them by their parents, I insert these as well, all sorts of experiences. Now I 
am starting to add photographs as well. I just thought it’s much more prac-
tical from my point of view to write down if something happened immedi-
ately that evening, rather than go back to it in a month. (Ilona, foster 
mother of three)
Not all foster parents are as conscientious as Ilona, and some simply 
keep pictures of the child’s life in a folder on a computer or smart phone. 
I’ve seen many variations of life diaries as foster parents are typically proud 
of their children and celebrate their achievements with enthusiasm. The 
documentation varies in depth and quantity and it must be made available 
at the request of the foster parent advisor. This is in addition to the bi- 
annual reports that are filed by the child’s guardian, but are in fact typi-
cally compiled at least in part by the foster parent herself. While birth 
parents may be somewhat careless with the personal documents of their 
children, foster parents must have all personal and legal documents as well 
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as the history of the child’s life organized and potentially accessible at 
any time.
Administrative work is a hidden aspect of all parenting, but the lives of 
fostered children need extensive and in-depth documentation, which must 
be made available for scrutiny at a moment’s notice. Indeed, foster parents 
are now trained in the legal and administrative aspects of their jobs in the 
preparatory fostering courses they are required to take. The newly intro-
duced employment contract brings further administrative burdens for the 
parent as an employee, and this requires regular revisions, because wages 
fluctuate with the number of children in the home and other minor 
changes.
In summary, fostering is extremely difficult work, which requires the 
kinds of skills typically associated with women and especially mothers: 
emotional work, caring and advocating for others, negotiating, adminis-
tering, organizing and managing people’s lives. As women’s work it is 
often seen as being a “natural skill”. But as the foster parents themselves 
have described above, the contexts in which they do their work, and their 
overall work burden are hardly simple extensions of women’s feminine 
selves: they are examples of highly skilled labor, exhausting the body and 
the soul. It is thus especially appalling to understand the wages and work 
conditions of foster parents, which I argue place them squarely into the 
category of the carefare underclass.
Wages
Over 90% of active foster parents are women, and while several men are 
also certified as part of a foster family, only exceptionally can men without 
female spouses house fostered children. Single men in fact face a great deal 
of suspicion and discrimination when they aspire to the job, and foster 
parent advisors have asserted several times that fostering is really for 
women. This is relevant because female-typed care occupations (such as 
teaching, childcare or nursing) are especially devalued in Hungary, as 
indeed they are internationally (England 2005). As one foster parent said 
and this was not at all meant as a joke: “This is women’s work, because 
men can’t bear to work this much”.
Formal educational requirements are fairly low. Foster parents are 
expected to have completed elementary education only, but then they 
have to take a special skills training course of 500–600 hours and pass an 
examination at the end. Experience in successful childrearing is important 
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in the selection process. Some agencies explicitly require that applicants 
will have raised a child of their own. They consider this important to dem-
onstrate that the foster parent applicants are aware of the job of parenting, 
they have a track record of having raised children and also so they are less 
likely to think of foster children as their own.
While everyone involved agrees that fostering is extremely difficult and 
complex work, most foster parents earn less than the national minimum 
wage. Their salaries are set by state regulations and foster parents working 
for all agencies and with different levels of experience get the same amount, 
although some agencies may be more or less generous with covering spe-
cial costs for children or distributing an occasional bonus payment. All 
foster parents earn 30% of the national minimum wage, and another 20% 
of the national minimum is added for each child they foster. This means 
that a foster parent makes only 90% of the national minimum wage if they 
foster three children, which is the typical number in Hungary.2 In addi-
tion, women who foster children under age 2 may also receive parental 
leave benefits on top of their wages. Interestingly, while this benefit is set 
at 70% of the minimum wage for other women who do not have a higher 
income of their own (e.g., university students), foster parents only 
receive 50%.
Note that there are two types of minimum wage settings in Hungary: 
one for everyone, and another for skilled workers whose skill is required 
on the job. Many foster parents have secondary school qualifications and 
in any case they are expected to graduate from a year-long training course 
which endows them with a diverse number of specialized skills—as the syl-
labus of the program attests. As we have seen above, they employ all those 
skills and more in their everyday work. Yet the minimum wage that applies 
to them is the generic national minimum, not the specialized one, which 
would be 30% higher. Importantly, no distinction is made among foster 
parents by their educational level or experience, as is customary in other 
segments of the labor market. The only addition is an extra 5% of the mini-
mum wage if a foster parent raises a child with special needs. This amounts 
to about 8000 HUF per month or 22 EUR, which is roughly the price of 
ten Big Macs, to use this index of purchasing power parity.
2 The minimum wage in Hungary is the second lowest among EU members states after 
Bulgaria. A foster parent who raises three children gets paid 144,900 HUF (gross, taxes are 
payable), which is 400 EUR per month in wages in 2020.
 E. FODOR
93
The handful of professional foster parents already fostering before 
2014 in Hungary earned more than this amount, regardless of the num-
ber of children who were placed in their households. However, fewer than 
10% of all foster parents worked as professionals, the remaining 90% 
received an honorarium of 15,000 HUF a month per child, which was 
seen as a symbolic gesture of thanks, rather than a wage. This means that 
now the majority of foster parents receive more remuneration than they 
had before they were “professionalized”. They are now covered by the 
social security system, and the years spent fostering count toward their old 
age pensions. Yet the fact that they are getting wages below the national 
minimum for extremely taxing work that takes up every second of their 
lives is not missed by foster parents. As one of them succinctly put it: “If 
you insist on calling this paid work, you might as well call it slave work” 
(Ilona, foster mother of a small boy in a rural town).
In addition to the salary, each child receives an allowance from the 
state. This sum must be solely dedicated to his or her living costs, and, as 
I have already noted, foster parents must document the spending in detail. 
The size of the allowance is tied to the minimum old age pension payment 
(it amounts to roughly 150% of it). As I pointed out in the previous chap-
ter, the level of the national minimum old age pension has not changed 
since 2008 and thus has been devalued by about 30% since 2010. Most 
foster parents and social workers agree that the cost of raising children is 
higher than the allowance, especially for older children or children with 
special needs. Some agencies allocate extra funds for foster parents for 
specific costs (such as glasses or dental work) but these are unpredictable 
and vary across agencies. Similarly, foster parent network agencies occa-
sionally distribute treats on special occasions, such as vouchers to buy gifts 
at Christmas or Easter—the spending of which has to be carefully docu-
mented. Nevertheless, several foster parents claimed that they supplement 
the cost of food and basic necessities from their own salaries or that they 
couldn’t afford to foster if their husbands had not been making a 
decent salary.
Increased Work Volume
Many child protection experts agree that the job of fostering is getting 
harder and harder. As I pointed out earlier this argument was used to jus-
tify the need for disciplining, regulating, “professionalizing” foster par-
ents. Here is another very experienced foster parent advisor describing the 
situation:
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Children come from increasingly difficult life conditions. Their problems 
are often more complex and difficult to deal with. So practically every single 
child would need a learning therapist, a psychologist, psychiatrist, a develop-
mental therapist, a physician. What I mean is that life had been harder on 
these kids than for those who we had years ago, and to help them and treat 
this is no small task. (Foster parent advisor, social worker, Budapest agency)
This is especially so because foster parents raise a growing number of 
children. The number of children in need has been increasing, yet national 
campaigns to recruit foster parents have not been particularly successful, 
so their numbers have been stagnating. In 2000, 25% of foster parents 
raised three children or more, in 2010 almost 40% did, and in 2020 the 
figure stood at over 50%. Until 2000 more than half of all foster parents 
raised only one child. Now there are fewer than 20% working in this cat-
egory (KSH 2019a). More children, especially more children with major 
psychological or developmental issues, means significantly more work per 
parent. This process started earlier, but the incentive structure set up by 
the 2014 regulation has reinforced it. It is making increasingly more sense 
to consider fostering as one’s only paid job rather than as something to do 
in addition to working elsewhere. In this context, more children are 
needed to make a livable, even if meager, income.
Heightened Expectations, Surveillance and Control
As foster parents’ relationship to the state turns into one of employment, 
expectations on the part of the employers increase as well. The administra-
tive burden has grown with the employment relationship. As a policy 
expert in the Child Protection Service explained to me: “We expect them 
to be more disciplined, more cooperative. This is in fact the goal of chang-
ing the relationship into a professional one. That and that they should be 
required to participate in trainings.” Both the agencies and foster parents 
agreed with this claim. To illustrate I selected the words of a foster parent 
who compared the heightened expectations to the ridiculously low com-
pensations she receives:
Especially now that they [the state] put them [the legal guardians] on my 
shoulders too … sure I get some money in return. Now I get all of 30,000 
HUF. And this should make me feel really good because I now have a salary 




As already suggested in the above quote, in addition to an increased 
workload, heightened expectations and low wages, the process of profes-
sionalization is also accompanied by an intensification of surveillance over 
foster parents’ work.
I’d like to help children live in a happy, safe, well-balanced, normal family. 
But instead, I assign them [the foster parents] an external guardian, send a 
foster parent advisor on them, maybe more than one guardian because each 
child could have a different one. And I turn the home of foster parents into 
a zoo … who, by the way, I force to take the child to visitation meetings 
with birth parents every weekend. (Director of a foster parent network 
agency, Budapest)
At least two supervisors visit families on a regular basis: the foster par-
ent advisor is the most important and is the parent’s primary contact to 
the agency. In addition, as of 2014 each child has a legal guardian, who is 
a representative of the state, and who makes all final decisions for the 
child. He or she also visits regularly and, as the quote suggests, guardians 
are assigned to children, not families, so a family may have several such 
officials involved in their lives now. In addition, representatives from the 
agency may also stop by for a variety of reasons. Some of these visits are 
unannounced, but most are arranged in advance, depending on the sched-
ules of the parties involved. Most foster parents had only a vague idea of 
how often exactly the visits are supposed to happen, but they did sense 
that they must accommodate someone almost weekly. This coupled with 
the bi-annual weekend trainings they must attend, network-wide holiday 
gatherings, as well as the bi-weekly or monthly birth parent visitation ses-
sions, which also often happen at the agency’s premises with supervision 
from the agency, all taken together provide a great deal of opportunities 
for contact.
Typically, foster parents try to build a good relationship with their advi-
sors as they see them not only as their direct supervisors but also as their 
contact to the agency. Advisors also serve as a source of practical advice or 
emotional support. During their monthly visits, the foster parent advisor 
talks to the child and the foster parent, but also has the right to open 
refrigerators, wardrobes and toy storage boxes to make sure the child has 
all that is prescribed by law and deemed necessary by the agency. They also 
assess the cleanliness of the home in general, and comment on it should 
they find it not up to their standards.
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I am being continuously monitored. When Adam came to live with us, they 
[representatives of the foster parent network agency] visited me twice a 
week. I cleaned more than ever, because I was worried that they would find 
something amiss. Then, after a while I got used to the visits and gave up on 
the extra cleaning. (Natalia, foster mother to newborns, living in a 
small town)
Natalia is a relatively recent foster parent who specializes in looking 
after newborns until they get adopted. She has a college degree, but gave 
up her job as a marketing manager a few years ago, and now lives with her 
husband, three school-age birth children, and a varying number of fos-
tered babies in a small town about 60 minutes east of Budapest. She is 
perhaps the most vocal about the ongoing surveillance, but several foster 
parents told me horror stories they had heard of especially brutal advisors, 
for example the one who stopped by randomly during the weekend lunch 
period and looked into pots to see what the children were being fed. The 
stories may not be true, but they do reflect foster parents’ understanding 
of their vulnerability to the gaze of their advisors, which penetrates even 
the walls of their bedrooms.
Their lack of control over their work lives manifests most often when 
they are assigned children or when children leave their homes. Several 
accounts describe how foster parents are increasingly unable to influence 
these two vital processes. One foster parent, for example, was asked to take 
in three children with exactly two days’ notice. She had space for two chil-
dren, but had no control over either the number or the timing of their 
arrival.
Once they identify a child they ask you to host, they call you on the phone. 
In principle you would have time to discuss this with your family and give an 
answer in a few days. Yeah, dream on. I’ll tell you how these three children 
landed here and you’ll see. When we were just receiving an honorarium we 
could say no. Then we had this training and they told us that we’d better 
agree to accepting the children they send us. (Anikó, foster parent of four 
children, rural town)
Foster parents are especially prohibited to reject children on the basis of 
ethnicity. This is an important issue, since—according to estimates—
between 30% and 50% of the children in the system are of Roma ethnicity 
and, as I explained above, discrimination against the Roma are widespread. 
Foster parents are not immune to racism either, even though they are 
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trained explicitly to avoid it. Some express fear of how the child will be 
accepted in their local communities, others are concerned about meetings 
with the birth parents. Yet others simply feel animosity toward a child who 
looks “different”. Thus some of the prohibition against picking and choos-
ing of children has to do with the agency’s fully justifiable desire to avoid 
racial discrimination. But the point here is that foster parents noted a 
change in attitude toward them since the start of their employment rela-
tionship and argued that they became more vulnerable as a result of the 
new form of dependency.
For their part, foster parent advisors are well aware of their role in 
the system.
I try to stay friendly with them [the foster parents] so they wouldn’t see the 
supervisor in me but the helper. But obviously my main role is to follow up 
on whether or not their work serves the interests of the child. But I am usu-
ally friendly with them and I do the checking up part while we are chatting 
and I help a great deal if needed. (Emese, foster parent advisor, rural town)
Until 2014 most foster parents had legal guardianship rights over their 
children, but in 2014 each child was assigned a separate guardian, and 
foster parents could not take on this role any more. This was experienced 
as a logistical hurdle, but also an expression of lack of trust and loss of 
control.
One [problem with the new situation] is that they don’t trust us [to make 
the right decisions for the child].The other is that we have another person 
who we are accountable to. (Marika, long-time foster parent, now raising 
four children)
Or as another experienced foster parent explained why she found it 
offensive that legal guardians now have the final word on major life deci-
sions about the child:
You know, it is really strange [to have a guardian overseeing her work]. I am 
raising this child. I know what he needs. I am responsible for him too. Yet, 
I don’t make the decision, I am sometimes not even asked. (Paula, foster 
parent to two children)
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Gendered Altruism as a Form of Resistance
Consistent with the logic of carefare, work conditions have worsened and 
wages are appallingly low. Why do foster parents agree to these employ-
ment conditions? One possible answer is that they simply have no alterna-
tives: the “whip of hunger” forces them to accept even these conditions. 
But this is inconsistent with what I heard from my interviewees. Most 
foster mothers I talked to could list several job alternatives, or positions 
they gave up for fostering. Granted, some of those jobs required long 
traveling, shift work or working very long hours, but they did not neces-
sarily mean more overall effort than the work they were doing now. Several 
of my respondents said that they chose fostering because they wanted to 
help children, and associated caring for others with their true feminine 
identity. In other words, they evoked altruism and the importance of a 
meaningful, caring life as a form of highly gendered moral rationality 
(Duncan and Edwards 1999), that is, as a rational choice, which was not 
based on economic gain but on a specific orientation to life and a system 
of values sharply at odds with the mainstream expectations. A good exam-
ple is Zsuzsa, an engineer, one of the few foster mothers I interviewed 
who had a professional, full-time job in addition to raising two fostered 
and two biological children (with a stay-at-home husband). She told me 
that her friends and family do not quite understand why she and her hus-
band chose to foster on top of all her other work. But, she said, “We 
wanted to do something meaningful, something that we can later explain 
to our children” (Zsuzsa, fostering two children, biological mom to two 
in Budapest). Blanka, who used to work as a nurse in a nearby hospital 
before she resigned to raise foster children explained to me laughing: “I 
know this sound silly but I don’t like to be working for money” (Blanka, 
foster mom to 2 toddlers, small rural town).
As a corollary, foster parents often claimed that what they did was not 
work but part of the natural flow of their lives, part of who they were. One 
example of this position comes from Tanya, a long-time foster parent who 
lives in a village outside of Budapest. She acknowledges that fostering 
requires energy, but makes a sharp distinction between work and family. 
The term “work” has no place in the “natural” setting of a family:
I don’t think of this as work. Because I think this is a natural thing. We have 
children, we come home, just like raising my own kids, this is not work either. 
I mean there’s a lot of work with this, yes, and I get really tired by the eve-
ning … but this is not a job for me. It is family. (Tanya, foster mother of three)
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Other women claim that what they do does not require special skills, 
only their womanly instincts. Kata, a foster mother of two with two bio-
logical children of her own said this:
I am not trained as a nurse, I cannot offer anything extra. I am just a mommy 
who is simply capable of raising healthy children.
She is seconded by another foster parent who, when I asked her if she 
considered what she did as work, replied: “I … I don’t really know. To me 
this is really routine, not a big deal at all. No, this is not work” (Juli, long- 
time foster mother, currently raising three children).
An important correlate of altruism is that love seems incongruent with 
financial compensation: both foster parents and their agencies subscribe to 
the “hostile worlds” argument (Zelitzer 1997). This was one of the rea-
sons why I heard repeatedly that fostering should not be thought of as 
paid work. Instead, foster parents and their advisors used a variety of dif-
ferent words to describe what they were doing including “love”, “calling”, 
a “hobby”, a “lifestyle”, a “way of life”, a “service”: fostering was thought 
of as outside the realm of paid work as something opposite to the world of 
work and financial compensation.
If I were a child, I wouldn’t want my foster mother to get paid so she would 
love me and keep me in her family. I don’t think that would be good, not 
even for the self-resect of foster parents. With this move [the 2014 legisla-
tion] they took away the only important thing, that they can do charitable 
activity, that they can help kids. Now we say this is their job, like for a 
teacher or child care worker. (Diana, experienced foster parent advisor 
in Budapest)
Or as another policy expert put it:
This is all about children, we cannot treat this as work. A foster parent must 
be a lot more than that. It is not enough just to satisfy the daily needs of the 
child, to offer clean clothes, room and warm food. An institution can offer 
all that. A foster parent needs to give more: her soul and her love. (Social 
worker, policy expert)
Soul and love cannot be bought and, it seems, need not be compen-
sated for either.
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concLusion
This chapter illustrated an important yet well-hidden aspect of Hungary’s 
carefare regime: the construction of primarily female, paid—but barely 
so—care workers through the process of professionalization from above. 
A new piece of legislation, fully in line with expert recommendations, 
transformed the relationship of foster parents to the state into that of 
employment. As employment contracts go, this one is quite unfavorable to 
foster parents: it increases their work volume, the expectations placed on 
them and the length of training required for the work, it exacerbates the 
surveillance foster families are subjected to by state actors, and wrests from 
them even more control over the work process. In exchange for work 
done in these extremely precarious conditions, foster parents get paid less 
than the minimum wage. They also became part of the social insurance 
scheme and now expect to draw pension benefits—proportionate to these 
wages. Foster parents thus joined the underclass of female care workers 
whose exploitation forms one of the foundations of the anti-liberal regime. 
The transformation in this area of child protection also highlights the re- 
engineering of the state in an anti-liberal political direction: the channel-
ing of public funds into the coffers of politically loyal religious 
organizations.
Both the discursive justification of the changes in state policies, and 
foster parents’ resistance to these, are based on the assumption that caring 
is women’s natural skill and the ultimate meaning of their lives. State agen-
cies can afford to pay precious little for the vast amount of work foster 
parents do, and foster parents can justify their acceptance of these extremely 
precarious work conditions by relying on a gendered hostile world argu-
ment: love for children and proper financial compensations do not mingle, 
and women’s ultimate expression of femininity is in the work of caring 
selflessly for others. As long as foster parents, especially foster mothers, 
agree to conceptualizing their employment relationship as one of moth-
erly altruism, and feminine meaning making, carefare will thrive.
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Abstract This chapter is a brief summary of the main arguments and a 
development of the point that carefare policies form an integral part of the 
political success and legitimacy of the anti-liberal regime. The chapter also 
shows how selective and exclusionary the policies are.
Keywords Anti-liberal • Hungary • Gender inequality • Class 
inequality • Carefare
“God created men and women so they together may form a whole, which—
when complemented by children—we call a family. In the family and in 
society women embody gentleness, devotion, care, empathy, beauty, com-
plementing men so they together can show the way to the next generation. 
Mothers are the heart and soul of families, the whole society and the nation.” 
(Official Facebook post by MiklósKásler, Minister of Human Resources, 
March 7, 2021)
To mark International Women’s Day in 2021, the European 
Commission issued a statement which enumerated women’s multiple con-
tributions to the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic: their work as 
doctors, nurses, teachers and shop assistants. The communiqué empha-
sized the European Union’s commitment to gender equality and listed a 
104
range of measures to be introduced in the near future to this effect.1 The 
Hungarian Minister of Human Resources, for his part, took a rather dif-
ferent angle. In a statement on his Facebook page quoted at the top of this 
chapter, he chose to greet heterosexual mothers only on International 
Women’s Day and laud them for their gentleness, caring and kindness. He 
emphasized the fact that women’s role was to complement men’s work 
and reminded us that women’s contributions to families, society and 
nation all belong to the realms of the heart rather than to the material 
world. The contrast between the two approaches—the European 
Commission’s and the Hungarian government’s—could not be sharper 
and could not illustrate more clearly the main arguments in this book.
A new type of political order has emerged in Hungary since 2010: a 
form of authoritarian capitalism with an anti-liberal political and social 
agenda. An important part of this agenda directly targets gender relations, 
specifically women and women’s work. To conclude and summarize the 
points I made in the previous chapters, let me start with Gabor Scheiring’s 
(2019: 254) analysis of social and political developments in Hungary. 
Scheiring calls the post 2010 Hungarian state “accumulative” and shows 
how FIDESZ and its cadres are deeply involved in reshuffling the existing 
class structure: they are creating their own politically loyal and economi-
cally powerful bourgeoisie through the process of state-assisted, dubiously 
legal, capital accumulation. The expropriation of resources, however, is 
taking place at the expense of those in the lower half of the social hierar-
chy. Scheiring points out that this is bound to lead to polarization and 
social tension, which may explain the authoritarian turn in Hungarian 
politics. Authoritarian rule, specifically authoritarian populist strategies are 
being deployed to retain the support of the economically disadvantaged. 
The government’s discursive construction of “moral panics” successfully 
transforms conflicts about widening economic inequalities into disagree-
ments about cultural and ideological issues (ibid.). Indeed, one key exam-
ple of such a moral panic has been the government’s purported struggle 
against what they call the international “gender lobby”. As I pointed out 
1 See Statement by the European Commission ahead of the International Women’s Day 2021. 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_890. Numerous 
critiques question the EU’s commitment to and limited conceptualization of gender equality 
(see, e.g., Repo 2016). The point here is the contrast between the messages directed at 
women in Hungary and in the European Commission only.
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in Chap. 1, this has been sustained, if with slightly modified content, by 
the government-friendly media for the past four years.2
Starting in the mid-2010s Hungary’s anti-liberal political regime began 
to deploy an even more spectacular strategy to ameliorate social conflict 
around redistribution: pronatalist family policies. The decrees passed from 
2014 onward provide a significant amount of cash support—some ear-
marked for specific purposes, others freely usable—to families with chil-
dren. Better-off families receive and can utilize a larger share of the 
subsidies but even lower-class, working families are able to access several 
of the newly introduced tax credits, baby loans and mortgages. This may 
open new financial possibilities for eligible families among the roughly 
one-third of Hungarians who had been unable to set money aside as sav-
ings and for whom investment in housing, for example, may have seemed 
like a hopeless goal. In other words, the financial rewards of the newly 
introduced family policies reach social groups in the lower half of the 
social hierarchy, many of whom had been losing hope when faced with the 
difficulties of finding decent, stable jobs which pay a living wage, and the 
sluggishness of the rate of intergenerational upward mobility (Huszár 
et al. 2020). The “family protection measures” of the recent Orbán gov-
ernment guarantee that some limited resources trickle down to this group, 
who are a crucial part of FIDESZ’s electoral base (Róna et al. 2020). The 
process does not ameliorate class inequalities because of the highly selec-
tive targeting of the rewards of family policies, but the measures have, 
nevertheless, impacted and partially reorganized not only gender relations 
but also the stratification order. Hungary’s anti-liberal government has 
utilized the re-regulation of gender relations to modify socio-economic 
inequalities in a politically efficacious way.
2 The most recent variety of the “gender panic” at the time of writing this chapter is related 
to homosexuality and the supposed threat it poses to the future of the Hungarian nation, 
Christian civilization and/or the morality of children. In the first three months of 2021, 
Magyar Nemzet [Hungarian Nation], the vehemently pro-government online daily I 
described in Chap. 1, published 79 articles containing the term “LGBTQ”. (Of the roughly 
similar number of articles on “gender” in the same period almost half contained the term 
LGBTQ and many more lamented the threat of non-heterosexual forms of sexuality without 
explicit reference to the term.) Nothing proves better the fact that this is a “moral panic” 
artificially created for political reasons is the admission of the Hungarian Minister of Family 
Affairs, Katalin Novák, herself who pointed out that issues related to non-heterosexuality, 
specifically gay adoptive parents, is not among the “top 100 problems of Hungarian people” 




The principle of “divide and conquer” is part of this political strategy. 
Not everyone is eligible for the tax benefits or the child allowances. First, 
the vast majority of funding is tied to sustained participation in the formal 
paid labor market, and more than one income within the family which is 
above the national minimum. In 2018, 73% of the working age 
(20–64 years old) population was employed for wages. Although employ-
ment rates have increased most among the least educated social groups in 
recent years, vast inequalities among the Roma ethnic minority and the 
non-Roma majority remain: in 2018 the employment rate of Roma men 
and women was 44% and 23%, respectively, compared to the employment 
rates of 81% for non-Roma men and 65% for non-Roma women. Most of 
the Roma population are thus simply excluded from the government 
windfall, notwithstanding the fact that they are more likely to have chil-
dren than the majority of the population and certainly are more likely to 
be in need of support in order to move out of poverty. In addition, accord-
ing to recent estimates, close to 40% of all employees are contracted to 
work for the minimum wage, reducing the possibility for other groups to 
partake of the newly available resources. Second, even among those who 
are employed and financially eligible, the majority do not have children in 
their households: about 22% of those employed have one child, 17% two 
children and only 6% have more than two (Bakó and Mészáros 2019). 
This means that only about 40% of the population between 20 and 64 years 
of age are eligible to apply for the subsidies which are tied to both labor 
market participation and the presence—or promise—of children. It is 
these white, heterosexual, working families—constructed as “deserving” 
by mainstream political propaganda—who are targeted by the recently 
passed measures.
The benefits received via the wide range of pronatalist policies and 
related measures do not guarantee long-term compensation for raising 
children. However, in the late 2010s, when paid work was plentiful, the 
primarily one-off benefits allowed a respite, offered new opportunities to 
buy a larger house, to renovate a home and to spend a little more money 
on necessities, which might not have been possible otherwise. In addition, 
those at the bottom of the income distribution saw a proportionately 
larger increase in their wages, thanks to the tax credits, than those at or 
above the average.3 This potential upward mobility is quite fragile: in the 
3 If you are a member of the “deserving” families and you are employed and make the 
minimum wage and together with a spouse can claim tax credits for two children, your joint 
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case of someone losing their job they also lose eligibility, yet loans still 
need to be paid back. A divorce—not a rare occurrence in Hungary—may 
leave women especially vulnerable, and a variety of life events may prevent 
a family from having the number of children they had promised when they 
signed up for the government’s loan. The positive impact of these policies 
may last until the next election in 2022 but the risks involved for individ-
ual people are numerous.
Anti-liberal rule is thus built on the backs of women, especially on the 
backs of hard-working, ambitious, lower-class women. Women’s work 
burden is likely to increase if families are to access the tax credits, the baby 
loans, the cheap mortgage and other subsidies. The funding is available on 
condition that they have more children, and—given the typical division of 
labor within households—take on more care responsibilities, dedicate 
more time to care work. At the same time, they will continue working for 
wages too. But employers in the Hungarian labor market—both state and 
private, domestic and international—operate by regulations which largely 
ignore care responsibilities and thus disadvantage women. Alternatively 
and increasingly, the carefare state offers job opportunities in the care 
industry specifically for mothers—such as fostering as Chap. 3 demon-
strated—with the typically appalling work conditions that approximate 
those available to live-in migrant care workers in other parts of the world. 
Should women accept these conditions, their families may access these 
precarious “gifts” endowed by the government, but should they reject any 
parts thereof, they immediately become second-class social citizens. 
Furthermore, the participation of eligible women and families in the pro-
grams lends legitimacy to the government policies’ singling out and con-
structing the “deserving”, working, heterosexual family with children as 
the social group responsible for the country’s future and the only true 
hope for it.
I have called this set of policies “carefare”. Carefare policies, like work-
fare or prisonfare, are designed to discipline vulnerable workers into doing 
net monthly salary increases from 220,000 HUF to 260,000 HUF, which is an increase of 
18%. But if both you and your spouse make the average wage and receive 560,000 HUF a 
month, the additional 40,000 HUF tax credit for two children amounts to a mere 7% of your 
income. In other words, those at the bottom receive a higher increase relative to their wages 
through the child tax credit system. Similarly, a “baby loan” of 10 million HUF is of signifi-
cantly more value to those at the bottom of the social hierarchy than to those whose regular 
income is higher. If, however, low-income families do not produce the required three chil-
dren, the burden of paying back the loan is also much heavier.
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vastly undervalued work in exchange for claiming their social citizenship 
rights. Even though its elements are familiar from welfare policies else-
where, Hungary’s carefare regime represents a novel response to what has 
been called the care crisis emerging in financialized global capitalist econo-
mies: the conflict between the intensification of claims made on workers’ 
energies by their jobs and the simultaneous necessity to provide intensive 
parenting to children and care for others in need in  local communities 
(Fraser 2016). Hungary’s anti-liberal government has not fully resolved 
the conflict but it is experimenting with a new solution. The incentive 
structures of carefare policies, government propaganda which sentimen-
talizes women’s work and sets it in contrast to remuneration, the lack of 
feasible and enforceable gender equality measures and economic alterna-
tives, and the non-existence of woman-friendly trade union or women’s 
rights movements all work together to force women into having to increase 
their work burden and accept inferior and thus more vulnerable positions 
in the paid labor market.
This book has described Hungary’s gender regime. There may be an 
elective affinity between anti-liberalism and pronatalist “family protec-
tion” policies or the rejection of the principles of gender equality, but the 
relationship is certainly not deterministic or causal. Hungary’s geo- 
political position, its economic dependence on foreign investors and EU 
structural funds, its history of failed modernization projects tied to a vari-
ety of women’s emancipation agendas, the underdevelopment of demo-
cratic institutions, the recent trauma of social upheaval and numerous 
economic crises, as well as the history of authoritarian leaders and central-
ized propaganda, all add up to a confluence of conditions that lead to 
unique outcomes. Anti-liberal, authoritarian-leaning political rule is 
spreading fast in every part of the world; thus Hungary’s carefare regime 
should serve, if nothing else, as a framework to guide future comparative 
work on gender, social citizenship rights and the conditions of paid and 
unpaid work.
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Who is targeted? Allocation
Maternity leave 
(CSED)
Insurance Mothers who just 
gave birth
6 months benefit at 70% of 
salary, raised to 100% in 
2021.
Birth allowances Citizenship Lump sum upon 
birth
225% of minimum old age 
pension, value unchanged 
since 2008.
In addition, 425,000 HUF/
child deposited in a 
state-sponsored bank 
account.
Parental leave—flat rate 
(GYES, 1967)
Citizenship Parents with kids 
under 3
100% of minimum old-age 




(GYED, 1985 and 
GYED extra)
Insurance Parents with kids 
under 2 years of 
age
70% of the parent’s income, 
capped at 70% of the 
doubled minimum wage.








Who is targeted? Allocation
Child-raising benefit 
for large families 
(GYET)
Citizenship Parent with at least 
3 kids up to age 8 
of youngest
100% of the minimum old 
age pension, value 
unchanged since 2008.
Can only work part time 
while receiving this benefit
Paternity leave Insurance Fathers of 
newborn
5 paid days of leave at 100% 
wages.
Family benefit (under 2 
different names)
Citizenship All families About 13,000 HUF per 
child per month, no change 
in value since 2008.
Tied to school attendance of 
school age children.
Free textbooks in 
schools
Universal All children in 
school
Changed from means tested 
to universal.
School meals Means tested All children in 
school
Earned income tax 
credit (revised version, 
2014)
Insurance Fathers and 
mothers with 
children, in case of 
divorce where kids 
live
Maximum sum received as 
tax savings:
1 child = 10,000 HUF,
2 children = 20,000 HUF/
child,
3+ children = 33,000 
HUF/child.
No income tax for 
women with 4 children 
(2019)
Insurance Mothers of 4 or 
more children
Working mothers with 4 or 
more children do not pay 
income tax (Hungary’s flat 
tax rate is 15% in 2021).
1st marriage benefit 
(2015)
Insurance Newly married 
couples
5000 HUF net per month 
for 2 years.
Baby loan (2019) Insurance Married couple in 
childbearing age 
planning kids in 
the future
Couples may take a 10 M 
loan, interest free. They do 
not have to pay it back if 
family has 3 kids within 









Who is targeted? Allocation
Grandparent GYES, 
GYED (2019)
Insurance Working women 
and men with 
grandchildren
Working age grandparents 
can also take parental leave. 
Both parents have to have 
formal employment, for 
GYED version the 
grandparent also. Not 
retirees.
CSOK, rural CSOK 
(2014, with many 
modifications)




only if they do not 
have children yet 
but commit to 
having them
State benefit to buy house/
apartment. Have numerous 
components. Main one is a 
lump sum ranging from 
600,000 HUF to 
2.75 million HUF to buy 
house, depends on size/
quality of house and number 
of kids.
Subsidized mortgage 
to buy home (CSOK—
loan, reduction in VAT 
and application fees 
(2019+ later additions)
Insurance Parents, married 
or single
Subsidized loan following 
the previous benefit. 
10–15 M HUF, depending 
on number of kids or newly 
or not built apartment at 3% 
interest.
Special subsidy for 
multigenerational 
homes (2021)
Insurance Parents if plan to 
live with their 
parents, same as 
CSOK above
Same as CSOK above.
Mortgage release 
(2019)
Insurance Parents who 
promise to have 
more children
1 million HUF for each 
child the couple has.
State benefit to 
renovate and 
subsidized loans to 
renovate (2021)
Insurance Parents, married 
or single
Special benefit to support 
families who want to 
renovate their existing 
home, benefit + subsidized 
loan.
Subsidized loan to buy 
7-person car (2019)
Insurance Parents with at 
least 3 children
Subsidized purchase of at 



















The promise of nursery 
school places to be built 
(mostly on EU funds).
Children of working parents 
have an advantage in getting 
places in nurseries. 3/4th of 
mothers utilize the full 
length of the 3-year leave.
Extra vacation days for 
parents (2019)
Insurance Working parents, 
both, individually
For both parents as 
individuals, 2 extra days for 
1 child, 4 days for 2 kids, 
7 days for 3 kids. Double in 
state admin jobs.
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